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Foreword 
 
The contamination of Sudan by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) is the result of 
more that two decades of armed conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the 
Sudan People‟s Liberation Army.  In 2005 the United Nations and national authorities 
claimed that over a third of the country was contaminated, mainly in southern and central 
parts of the country.  Although it is now acknowledged that the total area of contamination is 
much less, mines and ERW continue to hinder the delivery of humanitarian aid return and 
settlement of refugees and Internally Displace Persons and hampers reconstruction and 
development, particularly in central and southern parts of the country.  
Mine action NGOs have been operating in Sudan for over ten years, initially in the South 
under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan with the focus on mine risk education and 
victim assistance.  Some demining was conducted by the warring factions, but no proper 
records were kept and the clearance was not conducted to international standards. 
The National Mine Action Office based in Khartoum and the New Sudan Mine Action 
Directorate based in Nairobi were established in early 2003 with support from United Nations 
Mine Action Service to undertake emergency humanitarian clearance of mines and ERW.  
However, coordinated mine action started in earnest following the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005 between the Government of 
Sudan and the Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement/Army.  On 24 March 2005 the UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1590 to monitor the implementation of the CPA and to 
establish a peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).  One of the 
responsibilities of UNMIS is the clearance of mines and ERW to enable the freedom of 
movement of peacekeeping forces, and to facilitate the safe delivery of humanitarian aid.   
As mandated by the CPA and the SCR 1590, in early 2005 the UN Mine Action Office 
(UNMAO) was established to support the deployment of the UNMIS forces and coordinate 
and undertake humanitarian the clearance of mines and ERW. The national mine action 
authorities have evolved to National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), National Mine Action 
Centre (NMAC) in the north and the Southern Sudan Demining Commission in the south, 
established by presidential decrees of the Government of National Unity and government of 
Southern Sudan, respectively.    
Currently most of the key mine action activities in the Sudan are managed by the UNMAO. 
However, the mandate of UNMAO expires in June 2011, by which time the national 
authorities should have assumed all necessary regulatory and coordination responsibilities.  
In order to accelerate the transfer of responsibilities to the national authorities, UNMAO is 
developing a Transition Plan.  Clearly, successful transition will depend on a carefully 
designed and well resourced capacity development plan to reinforce and further develop the 
national mine action capacities. This study by UNDP, as the lead UN agency for mine action 
capacity development within UNMAO, is the first step in the design of such a Capacity 
Development Plan. 
UNDP has conducted this study with the support of Ralph Hassall of Cranfield University.  
The UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology has been used as it provides a systematic 
and defensible method of assessing the capacity gaps and of prioritising capacity 
development activities and initiatives.  The study also includes a draft Capacity Development 
Plan which covers the transition period and beyond.  Much of the capacity development 
post-June 2011 will be conducted by the national authorities themselves, however it is 
envisaged that some ongoing international assistance will be required from UNDP and 
others. 
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UNDP and its national and international partners will work hard to ensure that the Capacity 
Development Plan is implemented, and indeed is updated on a regular basis to reflect the 
humanitarian, development and security goals identified in other national strategies such as 
the UN Development Assistance Framework, the UNDP Country Programme Document and 
other relevant strategies.  
[INSERT ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE] 
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY 
SECTION 1:  STUDY REQUIREMENT 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Sudan‟s National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established on 24 December 
2005 and official launched on 7 March 2006 with responsibility to direct and regulate mine 
action in the Sudan.  The NMAA, which is mandated by Presidential Decree1, comprises a 
National Mine Action Committee, a General Secretariat, a National Mine Action Centre 
(NMAC) based Khartoum, and the Southern Sudan Regional Mine Action Centre. In 
addition, the Southern Sudan Demining Commission on 27 June 2006 2.   The Committee, 
which is an inter-ministerial body with representation from civil society, SAF, SPLA, and 
GOSS and exercises its responsibilities through its Secretary-General, the Deputy Minister 
of Humanitarian Affairs. The National Mine Action Committee meets from time to time, but 
not a regular bases. 
1.1.2 Many of the key regulatory and coordination responsibilities remain with the UNMAO, 
including the accreditation of mine action implementing organisations, the development of 
national mine action standards, and management of the Information Management System 
for Mine Action 3.  The two national mine action coordination centres, NMAC and SSDC, 
have grown in size and capability but this has been in the absence of a comprehensive and 
agreed capacity development plan. 
1.1.3 The current mandate of UNMAO expires in June 2011, by which time the national 
authorities should have assumed all necessary regulatory and coordination responsibilities.  
In order to accelerate the transfer of responsibilities from UNMAO to the national authorities, 
UNMAO is developing a Transition Plan.  The aim of the Transition Plan is to guide the 
efforts of the UN and national authorities to enable a smooth and systematic transfer of 
responsibilities. 
1.1.4 An essential part of the transition process is the further development and 
strengthening of national capacities. But capacity development will not end when the 
UNMAO mandate expires in three years time; indeed it is assumed that the national mine 
action authorities will wish to continue to improve their abilities to effectively and efficiently 
manage and deliver capabilities. 
1.2 Aim and scope of the study 
1.2.1 The aim of the UNDP study was  to develop a comprehensive capacity development 
plan which will enable the Sudan Mine Action Programme transition to full national 
ownership.4 
1.2.2 The study addressed solely the regulatory and management requirements of the 
national authorities.  The needs of the national mine action implementing organisations have 
not been considered.  
1.3 Key references and assumptions 
1.3.1 The report is based on the responsibilities for managing mine action in Sudan as 
defined in the CPA, UN Security Council Resolution 1590, Government of National Unity 
(GONU) Presidential Decree 299, GOSS Presidential Decree 45 and other related 
documents including the National Mine Action Strategic Framework Agreement adopted in 
August  2006. 
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1.3.2 The CPA established an interim arrangement in which a single state is ruled by the 
GONU and a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS).  This „one country 
two systems‟ is central to understanding and analysing the effectiveness of the Sudan Mine 
Action Programme. 
1.3.3 Many challenges remain in Sudan. These include restrictions in the use of US 
mapping software (which limits the application of IMSMA), restrictions on the deployment of 
some international NGOs and commercial organisations, the lack of security (particularly in 
Darfur), and restrictions on transferring funds into Sudanese banks which complicates the 
direct funding of national organisations by international donors.  The Capacity Development 
Plan proposed in this report acknowledges these challenges. 
1.4 Terms and definitions 
1.4.1 For the purposes of this report:  
a. The Sudan Mine Action Programme refers to the NMAC, SSDC, UN and other 
international and national bodies and accredited implementing organisations 
involved in mine action in Sudan, and all current and planned mine action 
projects and activities authorised by the NMAC, SSDC and UNMAO; 
b. Capacity development is an activity, or activities, which enable individuals, 
groups, organisations, institutions and societies to increase their ability to 
manage and deliver capabilities in a sustainable manner - and to take 
ownership of the problem and its solution.  In mine action it involves inter alia 
the introduction of appropriate national laws and standards, the development of 
systems of governance and coordination, and the ability of national authorities 
to mobilise resources. 5 
c. Technical terms as defined in International Mine Action Standards (IMAS 04.10) 
have been used.    
1.4.2 A summary of the key terms and definitions used in the document  is at Annex A.  
1.5 Structure of report 
1.5.1 Section 2 discusses the component parts of the Sudan Mine Action Programme, and 
clarifies key terms used in the study including transition, national ownership, trusteeship, 
governance and capacity development.  This provides a firm foundation for the subsequent 
analysis of NMAC and SSDC and the development of the draft capacity development plan. 
1.5.2 Section 3 describes the approach used in the study and explains why the UNDP 
Capacity Assessment Methodology6 was adopted.  The approach provides a powerful way to 
examine organisations such as NMAC and SSDC from different perspectives and against 
different criteria. 
1.5.3 Section 4 provides an analysis and assessment of NMAC, and Section 5 provides an 
analysis and assessment of SSDC.  This is achieved by: 
a. Determining the required future capacities of NMAC and SSDC in terms of 
technical functions (such as managing clearance, mine risk education and 
victim assistance), and of regulatory and management functions (such as 
developing mine action policy and strategy, national mine action standards and 
guidelines and systems for accreditation and quality management);  and 
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b. Assessing the current capacities of NMAC and SSDC in terms of the ability to 
(1) engage with stakeholders, (2) understand needs, (3) develop policy and 
strategy, (4) develop, manage and implement projects and budgets, (5) monitor 
and evaluate projects, and (6) specific governance including planning, tasking 
and resource mobilisation. 
1.5.4 Section 6 establishes a set of capacity development priorities based on the analyses 
and assessments described in Sections 4 and 5.  Three sets of priorities are proposed: one 
set covering the „enabling environment‟ such as the development of national mine action 
legislation;  a second set covering ‟organisational performance‟ such as the transfer of 
accreditation and quality management responsibilities from UNMAO to the national 
authorities; and a third set covering the development of human resources. 
1.5.5 Section 7 provides a draft Capacity Development Plan covering three periods:  2009 
to 2011 (i.e. the period leading up to the end of the current CPA meeting its Mine Ban Treaty 
obligations), and 2014 to 2017 (i.e. the final phase of the eight year Plan). 
 
Notes on Section 1; 
1. Presidential Decree No 299 of 24 December 2005. 
2. Decree No 299 referred originally to a South Sudan Regional Mine Action Centre, which is now referred to 
as the South Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC), and more recently by some as the South Sudan 
Demining Authority (SSDA). 
3. National mine action data is held in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
database which is managed by UNMAO on behalf of the GONU. 
4. Aim and scope of study; see Project Terms of Reference, UNOPS 30 May 2008. 
5. The definition used here is an amalgam of (1) Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges, GICHD, Part II 
Chapter 10, Ted Paterson, and (2) p.3, UNDP – Capacity Assessment Practice Note, 2007, UNDP. 
6. Capacity Assessment Methodology, User‟s Guide, Capacity Development Group, Bureau for Development 
Policy, UNDP, May 2007. 
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY 
SECTION 2:  CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN SUDAN 
2.1 Mine action in Sudan - the current situation 
2.1.1 Since 2006, national authorities have been established to regulate mine action in 
Sudan. At a policy level, an inter-ministerial body with representation from civil society and 
the military, called the National Mine Action Committee is mandated to regulate the practice 
of mine action in the country7. The Committee‟s executive authority has been de facto 
accorded to its Secretary-General who is also the Deputy Minister of Humanitarian Affairs. 
The offices concerned with the coordination and oversight of mine action are NMAC in the 
north and SSDC in the south8.  
2.1.2 In the northern areas, the NMAC has been embedded within existing government 
departments and structures with a clear line of management, while in the southern region the 
national authority has been developed from informal politico-military institutional 
arrangements. There is a marked difference between the northern and southern approaches 
in terms of bureaucratic, executive and government systems. There is also considerable 
variability amongst national agencies in terms of capacity to manage and coordinate mine 
action operations, evaluated against objectively verifiable criteria. Regardless of these 
differences, the two poles of national agency operate under a single vision for mine action as 
outlined in the CPA and expanded in a Mine Action Policy9 and a Common Strategic 
Framework10 which is addressing the landmine/ERW contamination problems in the Sudan. 
Establishment of all these organisations and the authorship of related mine action policy and 
legislation represent significant achievements for national mine action in the Sudan. 
2.1.3 Alongside the existence of these national agencies, UNMIS comprises the bulk of the 
mine action effort in the country through its executing arm, UNMAO11. The programme is 
well funded and the UN component is staffed by international and Sudanese national 
personnel. UNMIS and UNMAO draw legitimacy from the CPA and UN Resolution 1590. 
While the Security Council mandate directs that international mine action organisations 
should „assist‟ the national authorities with coordination and technical advice12, in the 
absence of well established national mine action authorities, UNMAO has assumed direct 
control over responsibilities for the accreditation of demining organisations, and the conduct 
of quality assurance and control of all UN-sanctioned operations according to National 
Standards and Technical Guidelines (NSTG)13. 
2.1.4 The control centre for UN operations is the UNMAO headquartered in Khartoum, 
supported by three regional offices. To-date, UNMAO activities have been heavily centred 
on mission requirements, such as the clearance of roads and access routes in support of 
peacekeepers and opening of roads and routes to facilitate safe access.  Within the UN 
Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy14, UNDP leads on capacity development. Yet while there 
is UNDP representation within UNMAO, it is not formally subordinated to UNMAS15. UNDP 
alignment remains focused on the development of the capacity of national authorities to 
regulate and manage mine action.  This has sometimes not been aligned to the mission 
requirements, or with the requirement for rapid service delivery.  
2.1.5 The mine action component of the UN mission is overseen by a UN Mine Action 
Steering Committee which was established in 2004 to provide policy and establish priorities. 
However, this committee has not met since June 2006. 
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2.2 Imperatives for change 
2.2.1 The primary responsibility for mine action lies with the government of a mine-affected 
state. This is normally exercised through a NMAA which is responsible for establishing the 
national and local conditions to enable the effective management of mine action.  In most 
cases a National Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) or its equivalent will act as, or on 
behalf of, the 'NMAA'. In certain situations and at certain times, it may be necessary and 
appropriate for the UN, or some other recognised international body, to assume some or all 
of the responsibilities, and fulfil some or all of the functions, of a MACC.  This is the case in 
Sudan where, at the time the CPA was signed in early 2005, the UN was mandated to 
assume many of the responsibilities of a Sudanese MACC. 
2.2.2 Based on the provisions of the Presidential Decrees 299 and 45, since mid 2006 the 
NMAC and SSDC have steadily been developing capabilities, and now have the minimum 
required office space, transportation, and office equipment required of national MACCs.  
Most senior and mid-level managers of both organisations have attended formal 
management training, and the basis of an in-country coaching system has been established.  
Yet the original arrangement of early 2005 remains, with UNMAO retaining most of the 
regulatory responsibilities.  There is an understandable desire for change by the national 
mine action directors and their senior line managers. 
2.2.3 The current UNMAO and UNMIS mandates will expire in July 2011, as will the 
authority of the GONU.  By then, the UNMAO must have handed over all remaining 
responsibilities for regulation and coordination of mine action in Sudan; indeed it would be 
prudent to transfer all the responsibilities well in advance of the deadline.  
2.2.4 The Government of Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and 
ratified it on 13 October 2003.  The treaty entered into force for Sudan on 1 April 2004.  This 
requires Sudan to clear all known mines by 2014.  This is a national responsibility and 
requires national mine action leadership to ensure that the full clearance objective is 
achieved.  Furthermore, Sudanese national authorities need to establish the capability to 
meet other treaty requirements including the preparation and submission of annual Article 7 
transparency reports. It is worth mentioning that the Sudan has met its obligation under 
Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty having destroyed all its known stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines.  
2.2.5 UNMAO is well funded as it forms part of the UNMIS, but funding for other mine 
action projects in Sudan must compete with humanitarian and development projects 
worldwide.  There is a growing recognition that mine action will soon be affected by „donor 
fatigue‟, and countries such as Sudan with considerable potential income from oil and other 
exportable raw materials will be expected to fund its own mine action.  It follows that the 
national mine action authorities need to develop the systems, skills and knowledge to 
mobilise resources and manage funds. 
2.2.6 Deduction.  There is a need and an expectation for the national authorities to assume 
full national ownership of the Sudan Mine Action Programme.  This will require UNMAO to 
transfer some of its existing regulatory and coordination responsibilities prior to its mandate 
ending, and for the NMAC and SSDC to develop the necessary systems, procedures and 
skills to regulate and effectively manage all mine action within Sudan.  
2.3 National ownership  
2.3.1 The dominant narrative of capacity development and transition in Sudan is centred 
on the concept of national ownership. As with all socially constructed concepts, the meaning 
of the term is debated. This is certainly the case in Sudan, where multiple agencies, 
including national executive bodies, with different values, cultures, missions and mandates 
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seek to fulfil their objectives and in so-doing develop different perspectives of the concept of 
national ownership. 
2.3.2 The term ownership in a legal sense is used to describe the exclusive rights and 
control over physical or intellectual property. It is embodied in a right of ownership, which is 
often referred to as ‘title’.  Ownership also implies some degree of interest in maintaining, or 
indeed further developing, the value of the property.  
2.3.3 The term national ownership in a strict legal sense can be used to describe the 
ownership of property by the state, but it has slipped into the language of international 
organisations, NGOs and civil society - in a wider sense - as exercising the right and 
accepting the responsibility to address issues of national concern such as poverty, disease, 
human rights and global warming. 
2.3.4 In addressing such national issues and challenges, national ownership requires a 
state to provide effective and appropriate governance (see below), and it needs the 
engagement of civil society. But national ownership also requires the state to put in place a 
number of „technical‟ capabilities and systems to enable the Government to exercise its 
responsibilities. These include the development and use of national regulatory processes 
including appropriate laws, the ability and willingness to plan and prioritise, the ability to 
mobilise and manage resources, the management and effective use of information, and the 
development of human capital and physical assets. 
2.3.5 However, the term national ownership alone is insufficient to capture the 
characteristics of accountability and legitimacy which is the essence of governance as 
exercised by the UNMAO. For example, UNMAO cannot necessarily claim ownership on the 
behalf of the Sudanese people, thus there is nothing „owned‟ which can be transferred. The 
term ‘trusteeship’, which implies a sense of both assumed and sovereign legitimacy in the 
delivery of certain services designed to bring about social outcomes can be used to bridge 
this ideological gap16.  In this study, the term trusteeship is used in preference to ownership 
to describe those responsibilities which are currently vested in the UN and which will, in due 
course, be transferred to national authorities in Sudan.  
2.4 Governance 
2.4.1 UNDP acknowledges that development agencies, international organisations and 
academic institutions define governance in different ways.17  Some describe governance as 
the system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, 
political and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and 
private sector.  Others describe governance in a more limited way as the action or manner of 
conducting the policy and affairs of a state, organisation or people.  For the purposes of this 
study, the more limited definition of governance was used. 
2.4.2 With regard to the regulation and management of mine action in Sudan, governance 
can be considered as comprising two sets of capabilities: specific and general as described 
below. 
2.4.3 Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable 
the national authorities to regulate and manage mine action.  These include inter alia 
organisational and operational accreditation, national mine action strategic planning and 
prioritisation, the mobilisation of resources, the management of mine action information 
management using IMSMA, and the handover of safe, cleared land. 
2.4.4 General governance refers to the broader environment which enables the specific 
governance systems, processes and procedures to be developed and applied. This includes 
the ability to recruit and select employees based on merit; the ability to ensure that technical 
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decision making is not heavily influenced by politics; the ability to ensure that decisions are 
made in a transparent manner; the ability to ensure that accountability is maintained within 
individuals within organisations; and mechanisms to ensure a high level of public access to 
decision-makers to ensure that policy reflects the needs of citizens. At a more technical 
level, it requires the development of robust management procedures that will allow the 
efficient and effective management of processes. 
2.4.5 This distinction between general and specific governance is applied to the analysis 
and assessment of the NMAC and SSDC in Sections 4 and 5. 
2.5 Transition 
2.5.1 The Oxford Dictionary defines transition as „..... the process of moving from one state 
or condition to another.‟  This lends itself to the concept of transitioning the Sudan Mine 
Action Programme to full national ownership, which involves taking the programme from a its 
current state (where many of the regulatory and coordination responsibilities are being 
exercised by UNMAO) to a state where these responsibilities are exercised by national 
authorities, perhaps with some limited international assistance. 
2.5.2 UNMAO has appointed a Transition Programme Officer to act as a focal point for this 
work with the aim of developing a transition framework and plan by the end of 2008.  A 
workshop was held at the International Mine Action Training Centre in Nairobi from 25 - 28 
February 2008 to address the transition of the Sudan Mine Action Programme to full national 
ownership. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss the issues which will impact on the 
programme transitioning to national ownership. 18  Two more workshops were held in Nairobi 
and in Khartoum, and a final workshop will be held in Juba on 18 November 2008.  
2.5.3 The development of the transition framework and plan has required the UNMAO, 
UNDP, NMAC and SSDC to examine closely the detailed capabilities which comprise a 
national mine action capacity, to identify the responsibilities which need to be transferred 
from the UNMAO to national authorities, and to consider the elements and components of 
capacity development.  The work has shown that the requirements of transition and capacity 
development are complementary and mutually reinforcing, but are not identical. 
2.6 Capacity development 
2.6.1 Capacity development19 is a broad concept which enables individuals, groups, 
organisations, institutions and societies to increase their ability to manage and deliver 
capabilities - and to take ownership of the problem and its solution.  In mine action it involves 
the introduction of appropriate national laws and standards, the development of systems of 
governance and coordination, and the ability of national authorities to mobilise resources 
from national budgets. Moreover, it involves the development of national managers through 
education, training and coaching. 
2.6.2 The UNDP Capacity Development Process involves five steps: 
a. Step 1:  engage with partners and build consensus. 
b. Step 2: assess capacity assets and needs. 
c. Step 3: prepare capacity development plan. 
d. Step 4: implement capacity development plan. 
e. Step 5: monitor and evaluate the development of capacities. 
This study addressed the first three steps of the UNDP process. 
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Notes on Section 2: 
7.  See Presidential Decree No (299), 2005. 
8.  See Government of South Sudan Presidential Decree 45/2006, In practice, few reporting lines exist 
between the southern and northern entities. 
9.  The Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework, May 2006. 
10. The Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework, June 2006. 
11. For more detailed assessments that evaluate the performance of the Sudan Mine Action Programme from a 
range of institutional standpoints see: Paterson and Bohle, 2008; Gomer et al, 2007; ICBL 2007; Bolton 
2008. 
12. See para 4 (c) Sudan Security Council Resolution 1590, 24 March 2005.  
13. Based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 
14. See Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Interagency Policy (6 June 2005) p.33 
paras 97-113, specifically para 105. 
15. This is also true of the MRE national coordinator position, which is supplied by UNICEF under a similar. 
arrangement, although two international MRE officers are incorporated directly into the UNMAO structure.  
16. These differences are not purely semantic; they have caused genuine disagreement over the process of 
transition. 
17. Governance Indicators - a Users Guide: www.undp.org/governance/docs/policy-guide-IndicatorsUser 
Guide.pdf 
18. Communique dated 28 February 2008. 
19.  Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges, GICHD, Part II Chapter 10, Ted Paterson. 
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY 
SECTION 3: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
3.1 UNDP framework 
3.1.1 Many capacity assessment methodologies, frameworks and tools are used by 
development practitioners. The UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology20 has been 
adopted for this project.  It provides a systematic and defensible method of assessing 
capacity needs, establishing priorities and sequencing of capacity development projects and 
activities. The approach can be used in complex development situations when it is not 
always obvious where best to understand the relative needs and/or the order of 
implementing capacity development projects and activities. Not least, it provides a common 
language to facilitate discussion about the scale and scope of the capacity assessment.  The 
method thus represents an appropriate method of determining the capacity development 
requirements of the Sudan Mine Action Programme. 
3.1.2 The UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology assumes there are two sets of issues 
which need to be addressed.  These are referred to as core issues relevant to the sector 
being assessed, and cross-cutting technical and functional capacities. 
3.1.3 Core issues include matters which are relevant to the context of the capacity 
assessment. In the case of this study, such issues include the implications of Sudan‟s „one-
country-two systems‟, the need for mine action projects to be based on broader 
humanitarian, national development and security priorities, and the particular needs of each 
of the five pillars of mine action.  Core issues also include specific matters identified by 
stakeholders during the design phase of the assessment.  
Figure 1:  UNDP Capacity Assessment Framework 
3.1.4 UNDP define cross-cutting technical and functional capacities as „... the capacities 
necessary for the successful creation and management of policies, legislations, strategies 
and programmes.‟  These include the ability of to be able to (1) engage with stakeholders, 
(2) define realistic goals, objectives and outcomes, (3) develop policies and plans to enable 
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projects, and (5) monitor progress and evaluate results.  At the project level, functional 
capabilities represent the procedures, information and skills needed to execute the project 
planning cycle. 
3.1.5 The UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology recognises that capacities exist at 
different levels:  individual, organisation and the external environment which includes the 
government, civil society and other key bodies with interest in the Sudan Mine Action 
Programme.  Capacity assessments should consider all three levels. 
3.1.6 The three dimensions (core issues, technical and functional capacities, and levels of 
analysis) are referred to as the UNDP Capacity Assessment Framework, and can be 
represented as a cube consisting of a number of cells; see Figure 2.  The UNDP 
methodology envisages that an assessment team will analyse the effectiveness of current 
capabilities by focussing on each cell, or groups of connected cells.  In this study, for 
example, SSDC initially were invited to express an opinion on the current effectiveness of 
key individuals to develop policies and plans with regard to demining projects.  These three 



























































































































































































Figure 2:  Modified capacity assessment framework 
3.2 Study methodology 
3.2.1 UNDP provides a „default‟ capacity assessment framework which must then be 
modified to meet the particular needs of the country, sector and organisation being 
assessed.  The default framework is described at Annex C.  The modifications used for this 
study are described at Annex D.  These modifications were made at the beginning of the 
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study and approved by the UNDP Senior Technical Adviser prior to the start of meetings and 
interviews with the Directors and staff of NMAC, SSDC and representatives of the 
Government of Sudan. 
3.2.2 The future capacity requirements of NMAC and SSDC were defined by referring to 
the traditional roles and responsibilities of a national mine action authority and coordination 
centre, modified to meet the particular circumstances existing in Sudan.  The requirements 
were assessed in terms of the five pillars of mine action, and ten core management 
activities.  The future core activities of NMAC and SSDC will be: 
a. Plan, coordinate, monitor and oversee all aspects of mine action in Sudan; 
b. Prioritise, task and authorise all mine action activities; 
c. Accredit mine action organisations in accordance with National Mine Action 
Standards and Guidelines (responsive to IMAS) before any mine action activity 
is authorised; 
d. Undertake quality management of all mine action activities; 
e. Revise National Mine Action Standards and Guidelines according to in-country 
needs and conditions.  Once revised, all concerned are obliged to adhere to 
them; 
f. Maintain the integrity of IMSMA; 
g. Coordinate and oversee the implementation of MRE to communities at risk on a 
priority basis; 
h. Mobilise the necessary funds from national and international sources to achieve 
mine action strategic goals; 
i. Support the Government of Sudan to honour its obligations under the Ottawa 
Mine Ban Treaty and other relevant treaties; and 
j. Coordinate and oversee the implementation of VA to ensure physical and 
psycho-social and economic rehabilitation and reintegration of the victims and 
survivors of landmine and ERW accidents. 
The future capacity requirements of NMAC are defined in Section 4, and the requirements of 
SSDC are defined in Section 5. 
3.2.3 An assessment of the current capacities was conducted using the assessment 
framework described at Annex D.  It is important to note that the preferred level of analysis 
for the NMAC was the organisation, whereas the preferred level of analysis of the SSDC 
was the individual.  A series of meetings, interviews and roundtable discussions took place 
in Khartoum and Juba between 26 July and 20 August 2008.  
3.3 Presentation of findings 
3.3.1 At the end of the assessment phase, a summary of the initial findings was presented 
to the UNMAO, NMAC and SSDC. This was shown in the form of a chart which assessed 
the level of current capacities against future requirements; see Annex D. 
3.3.2 Discussion of the initial findings led to a deeper understanding of the capacity gaps, 
and the need for potential enhancements.  This analysis of the gaps and recommendations 
for capacity development of NMAC is described in Section 4, and of SSDC in Section 5. 
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY 
SECTION 4: ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT 
THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION CENTRE 
4.1 Overview and entry level 
4.1.1 The NMAC is comprised of politico-military appointees, often on secondment from 
military units or other governmental departments. As a result there are strong political and 
military dimensions to work and organisational culture. Staff within the NMAC place 
emphasis on organisational performance, and this was chosen for the entry point for 
discussions of capacity. As the NMAC is already embedded within extant bureaucratic 
framework, the organisational structure may be determined by existing policy and 
regulations. So despite the organisational focus, the discussions regarding the structure of 
the organisation are still ongoing and organisational development recommendations should 
be mindful that organisational restructuring is “work in progress”.  
4.1.2 In order to elicit the future end-state, two roundtable discussions were held between 
the assessment team, the deputy director of the NMAC and the principal staff members, 
including the heads of department. For evidence of capacity within the functional areas, the 
roundtable discussions were supplemented by interviews with individual staff members, well 
informed persons, and any other international staff that have knowledge of the abilities of 
personnel within the NMAC. Documents outlining the current organisational structure, and 
the Sudan Mine Action Policy were also used as references, as these are mostly normative 
to mine action activities in the North. 
4.2 Future performance:  pillars of mine action 
This part of the capacity assessment defines the future requirements of each mine action 
pillar.  It describes the setting within which NMAC will be required to regulate and manage 
mine action in northern Sudan. 
4.2.1 Clearance  
If clearance rates continue as they are, the NMAC team envisage that within the next two to 
three years the majority of high impact clearance in northern Sudan will have been achieved, 
and the reduced nature of the humanitarian threat will determine the dimensions of the 
demining programme in northern Sudan. In order to meet the residual threat, the clearance 
programme will be primarily conducted by national organisations and the Joint Integrated 
Demining Units (JIDU), although international organisations may well still be operating in the 
country on commercial tasks in support of development, and humanitarian tasks. Logistical 
and financial support for national demining operations will also be managed through the 
NMAC, and unless machines are left behind after the departure of other international 
organisations21 there will be no fixed assets such as machines. In addition to the clearance 
work, survey, marking and other operations of organisations will be monitored; however 
there will be no specific implementation capacity in these areas.  Instead the NMAC will have 
a purely regulatory, supervisory and coordinating role.  
Aside from responding to specific clearance requests on a project-by-project basis, the 
NMAC envisage that policy will be influenced by executive authority within the Ministry for 
Humanitarian Affairs, the National Mine Action Committee, and other actors such as state 
governors. The policy process may well be affected by an ongoing decentralisation of 
authority to the state level. Even if the NMAC itself remains centralised and national the 
decentralisation process may bring financial implications with it, and this could change 
NMAC policy. Another influence on clearance policy will be the Ministry of Transport Roads 
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and Bridges and JIDUs will continue to work on the clearance of strategic routes. There is 
thus a clear developmental aspect to the clearance work. 
4.2.2 Mine Risk Education  
There will be no implementation capacity for MRE within the NMAC. Instead activities will be 
focussed on coordinating, monitoring and training of trainers as well as tasking and 
allocation of funds. While remaining mindful of the sustained requirements for basic mine 
awareness, and classic educational announcements, the principal MRE role at the end state 
is shifted towards community liaison and risk reduction. Therefore, technical MRE capacity 
will exist to review and approve national MRE initiatives as well as to review and update the 
national standards as required. The department is also able to monitor implementer activities 
and evaluate social impact of interventions in terms of knowledge, attitudes and practice. 
The training of trainer capacity allows MRE staff to brief and train implementers on good 
practice and emerging techniques within this discipline. 
At the local level, community networks and a surveillance system will be in place and these 
are monitored by the NMAC. At the central government level, there are a number of key 
partners from line ministries that have an important role to play in the delivery of MRE, these 
are: the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Information. These 
ministries have representation on the National Mine Action Committee through which they 
are able to influence mine action policy for MRE. The ministerial partners can also 
mainstream MRE across existing services, such as incorporating awareness-raising 
messages into educational curricula of schools in affected states. The NMAC envisages that 
it will remain able to provide on-going technical support to these mainstreamed initiatives. 
4.2.3 Stockpile Destruction  
Future performance within the stockpile pillar will centre on two organisational competencies: 
(1) the ability to liaise effectively with military units regarding caches of landmines that may 
come to light, and their destruction; and (2) maintenance of a reporting system and 
catalogue on the retained stockpiles of mines to ensure that the Government of Sudan 
remains compliant with the requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). Thus, the role of the 
NMAC for stockpile destruction is essentially a coordinating one, with coordination taking 
place between civilian departments at the central and local levels, as well as military units, 
potentially including those of non-state actors. The performance of the stockpile destruction 
pillar is closely linked with that of advocacy and the two complement one another.  
4.2.4 Advocacy 
Within the NMAC, advocacy is viewed as an overarching capacity that encompasses other 
pillars such as stockpile destruction, MRE and VA. This mine action pillar will thus have 
shifted in mandate in that it will also include advocating for funds in addition to generalised 
campaign for meeting Mine Ban Treaty obligations. This assumption is based on the 
anticipated requirements of the programme, i.e. that as reporting on the implementation of 
the MBT becomes a reduced technical activity the need for lobbying for external funding 
support for humanitarian mine action will grow. This shift in requirement means that the role 
of civil society organisations in the North such as the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines 
will be diminished, whilst the fundraising responsibilities of the national authorities will 
increase.  
4.2.5 Victim Assistance 
VA will continue to remain a high priority to NMAC and donors, who choose to fund national 
organisations on a bilateral basis. There will also be a greater contribution by government to 
VA activities as only the government can provide the scope of technical support and care to 
victims and their dependents in a sustained manner. While much of the VA activity will have 
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been mainstreamed into general disability programmes within other ministries such as the 
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Welfare, the NMAC will retain a supervisory role. 
This role will include supervising the collection of data relating to landmine and ERW injuries, 
ensuring that the programmes are compliant with internationally approved practice, and that 
the particular needs of landmine victims are not lost within generalised disability 
programmes. The MRE unit will also make sure that data related to victims that is collected 
during community surveys for the IMSMA database, are consistent with the nationally-held 
victim data.  
The NMAC also note that a new convention on the rights of the people with disability, which 
Sudan has signed, is due to be ratified. This will bring renewed attention on the issue of 
victims in general within the country and is a sphere of activity in which NMAC has a clear 
role to play. The activities of the NMAC in this regard will be supported by clear 
governmental guidelines that define what exactly constitutes being „a victim‟, combined with 
an advanced technical capacity for supervising the various activities associated with VA 
such as trauma management, rehabilitation, psycho-social counselling and vocational 
reintegration.  
4.3 Future performance: specific governance 
Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable the 
national authorities to regulate and manage mine action.  These include organisational and 
operational accreditation, national mine action strategic planning and prioritisation, the 
mobilisation of resources, the management of mine action information management using 
IMSMA and the handover of safe, cleared land, i.e. through ensuring quality of operations. 
This part of the capacity assessment defines how the NMAC foresees discharging the 
activities that relative to the specific governance of its mine action programme. 
4.3.1 Accreditation and quality 
The NMAC see that quality management is a tool for enhancing service delivery and that 
standards are integral to the conduct of operations, because they are linked to who can, and 
also cannot, undertake various mine action activities. Standards are also viewed as having 
strong linkages to capacity development. The NMAC will thus use a system of accreditation 
and quality management for international and national organisations that will be based on 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and NTSG. Because of their normative potential, 
the NTSGs will be incorporated into the standardised metrics used by the Ministry of 
Measurement and Standards. Once held by this ministry they can be used to further ensure 
consistency of usage throughout Sudan. This quality assurance mechanism will be managed 
by the Quality Management Unit which will quality assure activities included within the five 
pillars of mine action. This will be staffed by military personnel but assisted by technical 
advice from the functional departments themselves, for example MRE.   
The Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework is clear that aside from being registered by the 
Humanitarian Aid Commission in Sudan, all organisations including national and 
international NGOs, and commercial companies have to be accredited by the National Mine 
Action Centres in Khartoum or Juba as relevant before they commence undertaking any 
mine action operations in the Sudan.”22 In addition, quality assurance processes will ensure 
“implementation of the national mine action standards in accordance with IMAS with the aim 
to regulate mine action activities in the country.”23 Although the NTSGs will be used in the 
accreditation for all clearance implementers, the accountability mechanisms used for either 
state or non-governmental actors may well be different. In both cases, it is intended that 
future legislation, adapted and applicable to mine action requirements and which refer to 
NTSGs and other appropriate national standards will provide the clearest framework for 
accreditation and quality assurance.  
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For the State, clearance work will continue to be conducted by the Joint Integrated Demining 
Units. Standing orders will continue to be given to ensure compliance with the NTSGs, and 
NMAC quality assurance officers conduct site visits to ensure compliance to IMAS and 
NTSGs. Accountability, in this particular situation, is thus based on a military judicial system; 
negligence on behalf of the military can be addressed through existing legal mechanisms, 
and in this manner government can be held to account. The national system is thus viewed 
by the NMAC as providing a greater level of accountability than the external UN-system, 
because it is felt that there are less consequences of negligence for operators working under 
UN accreditation, and thus fewer rights for victims.  
For national and international non-governmental organisations, the accreditation process will 
involve a prequalification stage, which could include issuing requests for expressions of 
interest, for example. This would require interested organisations to submit details on 
experience, financing and so on. Following this, the IMAS-model organisational accreditation 
would take place followed by field accreditation. The standard quality assurance mechanism 
will then be used to assess whether the organisation remains compliant with the NTSGs. 
4.3.2 Information management  
Due to current embargoes, use of the Geographical Information System (GIS) software 
element within IMSMA is restricted within northern Sudan due to the US trade embargo on 
Sudan. While temporary IMSMA use is permitted under the trusteeship of the UNMAO, it is 
not clear whether it will be able to be used by the NMAC alone as and when the UN leaves. 
If it is not, the NMAC may have to resort to other tools to manage and manipulate hazard 
and impact data in a spatial manner, or UNDP could act as trustee of the IMSMA GIS 
software on behalf of the national authorities post-2011. Thus the information management 
team sees itself subject to certain external constraints which will in-turn determine future 
performance.  [Note:  it is understood that FMS - the developers of IMSMA - hope to get 
agreement with US authorities to license IMSMA for use in northern Sudan.] 
Regardless of the exact system used, information management will have a critical function 
within the NMAC; the department will provide operators with information on contamination. 
However, it will not actively collect data, data collection will be done through operators using 
dedicated proformas. National military clearance organisations such as the JIDUs will also 
have dedicated IMSMA officers (or equivalent) attached to the units to provide updates on 
clearance progress.  
4.3.3 Planning, tasking and resource mobilisation 
In general, financial resource mobilisation will vary with the economic situation of the 
country, the political importance of mine action, and the willingness of bilateral donors to 
provide support. The fortunes of clearance operations will also be strongly linked to 
development efforts within the country. This includes the incidental requirements for 
clearance in advance of development projects, such as construction in contaminated areas. 
There are thus perceived linkages to general development initiatives and strategies.  
With the exception of special projects such as JIDU operations, planning is likely to follow 
the status quo of separate north-south operational work-planning, and clearance work will be 
coordinated by an Operations Department which has liaison officers from the JIDUs. The 
Operations Department will be the primary developers of yearly work-plans, and five year 
documents such as the 2005-2011 plan, which will be used to solicit government funding. 
Activities within the plans could include development of capacity within the JIDUs and 
supporting the creation of new demining teams, in line with a strong militarised approach to 
demining. In this regard, the NMAC may attempt to solicit equipment and materials in 
support of JIDU demining operations.  
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Related work on stockpile destruction will remain an ongoing process of reporting with 
reactive activity on discovery of caches of mines – and destroying them in situ – therefore 
there is reduced requirement for specific planning activity in this area. For other pillars of 
mine action such as MRE and VA, planning and tasking will be conducted within specialised 
departments in partnership with Operations and NMAC directors. Planning may also involve 
the important governmental and civil society stakeholders, as well as representation from 
international organisations such as UNICEF. 
4.4 Assessment of current capacity:  programme and project management 
Following the analysis of the NMAC’s future capacity requirements across the five pillars of 
mine action, an assessment is required to establish those areas of performance that can be 
enhanced through intervention. The purpose of this assessment section is to those identify 
areas of need, by making a review of actual, current performance across the critical 
functional capacities at the NMAC.  
The end states reveal a considerable amount of liaison and advocacy activity, strong 
coordination mechanisms, and the ability to plan and monitor operations. This will require 
organisational competency to engage with a wide range of stakeholders, assess needs and 
create common visions for mine action, develop suitable policies and effective strategies. At 
a more operational level, the NMAC will need to be able to manage its own activities and 
initiatives as well monitor and evaluate the projects and programmes of others.  
4.4.1 Engaging with stakeholders 
The NMAC is competent in retaining linkages with national stakeholders. These include 
central government departments such as the Ministries of Planning, Health, Education and 
the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges. Within civil society, good relationships are 
maintained with those national organisations conducting MRE, VA and advocacy-based 
activities. In addition, the Sudanese Campaign to Ban Landmines has formal representation 
within the National Mine Action Committee structure, and are co-located in the same 
building. In terms of local government, state governors have significant input into mine action 
operations and staff at the NMAC feel that these relationships are of great importance as the 
ability to coordinate with military groups and negotiating access to controlled areas must be 
well maintained. There is general consensus that the quality of relationships between 
national organisations and the NMAC are sustainable and would not change significantly 
over time. 
With respect to foreign stakeholders such as UN Agencies, international organisations and 
donor governments, engaging with stakeholders is a more complicated activity. This reflects 
a combined lack of capacity on the part of some of the most interested and influential 
external agencies (such as UNMAO) and not only the NMAC to engage effectively. This has 
not been helped by formal processes which have developed in an exclusionary fashion. For 
example, external stakeholders have trusteeship of the specific governance elements of the 
programme and as a result the NMAC is circumnavigated by most international agencies 
during resource mobilisation, accreditation and tasking processes. Regardless of the origins 
of this deficiency, the ability for NMAC to engage in a full-bodied partnership with 
international agencies working inside Sudan is a very pressing short-term requirement, and 
thus an area which will require specific attention for capacity development.  
Recommendation: Interdependencies between the external and national agencies 
should be expanded to cover information exchange, joint work 
processes (such as planning, tasking and accreditation), and 
resource flows (information and financial). Engagement with 
the NMAC should be considered an integral part of UN 
operations. In this way, trust will be developed between the 
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two sides, and operations will be conducted in a symbiotic 
manner, rather than in a parallel fashion.  
4.4.2 Assessing needs and building visions 
Within the NMAC, there is an understanding of the formal needs assessment approach, 
which requires the rational investigation of need within society, measured at a local level. 
However, most prioritisation is driven by a top-down process that emanates from the central 
executive or state governor level and this naturally reduces the perceived utility of such 
approaches and thus their usages in the absence of external partners. For example, the 
NMAC is responsible for collecting data from communities and state authorities in a 
designated area, but tasks within that area are chosen that are politically expedient as well 
as humanitarian.  
This system has two implications: (1) that decisions for allocating resources are based on 
politics and not needs, which if this is in the interest of the electorate is acceptable from a 
rights-based rather than a needs-based perspective, and (2) that heavy influencing of 
technocratic processes such as humanitarian tasking could have implications for 
humanitarianism, as less-vocal but nevertheless impacted communities could be excluded 
from the delivery of services such as mine action.  
Addressing needs in an effective manner requires aligning stakeholders with a common 
vision. In it turn building a vision requires strong leadership, and the ability of those leaders 
to coalesce diverse viewpoints around common interests. At the top of the national authority 
structure, the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs is highly influential in developing 
policy for the organisation. This executive level could be supported by the National Mine 
Action Committee by incorporating a wider range of central government interests. This may 
help to facilitate dialogue, exchange of information and other resources between northern 
and southern mine action authorities. At present, the relationship between the two centres is 
of a formal, nature, defined through interaction in military-led tasking of the JIDUs, and 
governed through the use of military liaison officers.  
Recommendation: The needs assessment process should be formalised. In this 
way, incorporating the needs of impacted, and perhaps less 
focal communities, can be made established and opportunities 
for subordinating humanitarian objectives at the expense of 
political ones may be reduced.  
Recommendation:  Begin to reconvene the National Mine Action Committee. The 
Committee is established to provide oversight and inclusive 
policy-level support to the NMAC. It has representation from 
civil society organisations, and the GOSS has de facto 
representation through particular ministers that sit on the 
Committee. By ensuring that the Committee meets regularly, it 
is likely that work will remain aligned with justifiable 
developmental or humanitarian objectives into the strategic 
timeframe.   
4.4.3 Developing policy and strategy 
Policy and strategy development principles such as ensuring participation are not articulated. 
In addition, formal opportunities for public-policy dialogue do not exist, and it is unclear 
whether joint strategic planning sessions between northern and southern authorities could 
be conducted without third-party facilitation. This has not been assisted by the Mine Action 
Policy Framework, which although it sets out the roles and responsibilities of the mine action 
organisations and actors in the country, and some general principles of action, does not 
specify how policies and principles may be expanded. The result is a formal policy vacuum – 
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at least visible policy – and this means that (a) technocratic processes may become 
distorted through political pressure, and (b) reactive decision making may be arbitrary and 
inconsistent, which could lead to unjust practice.  
At a project level, the framework approach to planning is relatively well understood within the 
NMAC. Directing staff are able to articulate the meanings of aims, missions, and objectives 
in general, and are aware of the specific aims, missions and objectives of the NMAC. There 
is familiarity with a range of techniques for developing policies and strategies, and this is 
perhaps attributable to the participatory approaches employed in the development of the 
Mine Action Strategic Framework, Mine Action Policy and attendance on a range of training 
courses that cover programme and project management. However, it is therefore unclear 
how normative these technical approaches are to the northern Sudanese planning 
approach, and thus whether they are sustainable within a northern Sudanese context.  
Culturally-speaking, dominant bureaucratic thinking places emphasis on technical work 
planning on a yearly basis rather than at a strategic timeframe. Instead, a policy of reactive 
adjustment to changes within the programme is more apparent. For example, the Wau-
Babanossa railway project which called the JIDU capacity into being was apparently in 
reaction to specific UN positioning regarding accreditation, quality management, and 
contracting. In addition, strong executive authority that governs the activities of the NMAC 
places little incentive on departmental strategy development; priority and policy is dictated by 
external agencies such as the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges or State level 
authorities for specific mine/ERW clearance. While specialised technical departments such 
as MRE appear to have a greater interest in long-term planning, the utility may well become 
negated as these activities are increasingly mainstreamed into other government 
departments and ministries.  
Recommendation: The current policy framework for Sudan should be expanded, 
based on the principles set out within the Policy Framework. 
While the National Mine Action Policy Framework provides the 
general limits within which organisations can work, it only 
defines who can work and what they can do, rather than how 
they can do it. This means that the Policy does not specify how 
activities will be developed, who they will be developed for, 
and how they should be implemented. By creating a specific 
set of policies that defined NMAC action, opportunities for 
formalising and embedding local-level participation will present 
themselves, and the potential for political interference. In 
addition, relations between internal and external agencies will 
become more predictable, and thus manageable.  
4.4.4 Budgeting, managing and implementing 
Accountancy and budget control are managed through the Administration and Finance 
department. Between February 2007 and July 2008, the NMAC managed approximately 
$5.5 million (US) worth of expenditure. This expenditure was mainly on heavy and specialist 
equipment for the JIDUs; funding was mostly from national budgetary sources, or financial 
assistance through UNDP. In addition to this, the NMAC prepares regular budgets for 
personnel travel and subsistence allowances, and also provides direct financial budgeting 
assistance to the JIDUs. The NMAC has also been able to plan and budget for the 
development of a new headquarters building in Khartoum, as well as for a number of 
regional offices. This suggests that there is a level of competency in developing budgets and 
managing expenditure, but that there is room for improvement. 
In terms of human resource management, the NMAC is covered by a range of normative 
government policies and labour laws. Recruitment and selection are centralised, and 
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appointments are made within existing government structures. There is no evidence to 
suggest that individuals from non-governmental organisations can work-share within, or 
transfer across to government departments such as the NMAC. Aside from generalised 
employment policies, the NMAC has a comparatively open management style for a highly 
militarised department. There are regular briefings and interdepartmental meetings, 
extensive coordination with military units, and visits from members of parliament and other 
government stakeholders. 
The NMAC does not claim to be an implementing agency. However it is involved directly in 
planning and tasking, for example, in the tasking of national NGOs for MRE in conjunction 
with UNMAO, with facilitation from UNICEF. For the limited operational tasking processes in 
NMAC – in the current scope of work – there is a planning officer who also has responsibility 
for tasking. The planning officer is supported by a finance and logistics section, which is also 
used to provide direct support to the JIDUs when they are on operations. During operations 
of the JIDUs, IMSMA officers are also deployed to the field. This is so that they can report 
directly to the NMAC on the progress of operations and this allows the NMAC a greater 
degree of control over implementation. For more sizeable operations, the NMAC draws on 
logistical support from the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs.  
Recommendation: Where possible, external agencies should attempt to conduct 
organisational development of the Administration and Finance 
Departments within the NMAC. This should include 
accountancy, book-keeping as well as preparing and 
managing budgets. Since the systems are normative to 
standard governmental procedures, intervention should seek 
to augment and reinforce existing mechanisms, rather than to 
overhaul or completely change current practice.  
Recommendation: Establish a human resource policy for the NMAC, which 
reflects the realities of the prevailing system but which also 
follows the intent of the Strategic Framework for mine action in 
Sudan. This policy should establish the former working 
arrangements of personnel within the NMAC, including: their 
selection and recruitment, job-sharing possibilities, 
performance review procedure, length of service and the 
manner by which they should be trained and developed. 
Recommendation: The UNMAO and UNICEF officers in charge of MRE should 
continue to provide assistance in terms of planning support to 
the NMAC. As far as possible, NMAC staff should also 
continue to be involved in the management, monitoring and 
evaluation activities associated with these plans. This will build 
interdependencies as well as ensure the flow of established 
practice in these areas. 
Recommendation External agencies should attempt to conduct concerted 
organisational development of the Logistics Department within 
the NMAC. Activities should reflect the current and future scale 
and scope of NMAC resources, e.g. fleet of cars, facilities and 
the type and amount of equipment in the stores. 
4.4.5 Monitoring and evaluation  
Staff within the NMAC are aware of the importance of monitoring and evaluating projects. As 
an institution designed for supervision and coordination, they see this as a core component 
of their work. Staff recognise that the ability to monitor and evaluate is tied to (a) a 
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developed understanding of the technical task at hand, for example the technical 
requirements of reporting and cataloguing mines; and (b) skill in evaluation, and 
understanding and demonstrating attribution of impacts, for example it was stated by the 
MRE team that there were shortfalls in developing monitoring and evaluation packages that 
could explore the consequences of social intervention in detail. This is a state-driven request 
for further development in these areas and implies a desire to move away from the relatively 
constrained notions of process driven, quantitative evaluation that tends to dominate 
discussion of monitoring and evaluation in mine action. However, there was no 
demonstrated understanding of the need for participation in monitoring and evaluation and 
its potential for learning and developing capacity. 
Recommendation: External agencies should support the NMAC request for a 
more nuanced understanding of policy development and 
impact analysis. Intervention should address the manner by 
which policies are created and developed, the constituencies 
they serve, and the constituencies that they create. 
Recommendation: Wherever possible, external agencies should embed a 
participatory approach into developing NMAC policy. 
Participation could extend to the use of beneficiaries and other 
mine action organisations (e.g. from civil society sector), where 
appropriate.  
4.5 Assessment of current capacity: general governance 
General governance refers to the broader environment which enables the specific 
governance systems, processes and procedures to be developed and applied. The purpose 
of this part of the assessment of current capacity is to outline the general governance 
environment within the NMAC, in terms of facilitating or constraining future performance, and 
the permissiveness towards intervention and positive change.  
Most staff appointments are made through military mechanisms or through recruitment from 
a pool of retired military personnel. Heads of department have thus demonstrated 
competency in military service, and since mine action is viewed primarily through a security 
lens, the appointment of senior officers reflects the political importance of mine action. Other, 
non-military staff positions such as the director of the MRE department are competent. 
However, while the appointment system can be said to be generally meritocratic, talented 
staff within certain fields such as information management, are not often found within state 
structures. This is due to the lower salaries available to skilled Information Technology 
workers compared with the private sector. There is thus a risk that appointments to certain 
critical posts such as within the information management team may be less based on 
competency and more on other factors; and that rotations of staff can produce capacity gaps 
within the organisational structure which will impact on performance. 
In the early stages of organisational development of the NMAC, decision-making was a top-
down process. This may be attributable to the military background of personnel, which 
strongly influences organisational culture. However with placements of staff on a range of 
management courses, including senior and middle management courses, changes in 
institutional culture have been observed. While there is still as centralised dimension to 
decision making, there are now regular meetings between the director and staff during 
which, issues are discussed, agreement reached and decisions taken. Compared with other 
governments in the wider region, decision-making can be considered participatory in spirit. 
The NMAC thus has the capability to take informed decisions on a wide range of issues 
without difficulty. On matters of political significance, executive decisions are taken by the 
State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs. 
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This ability to make decisions may be linked to a greater levels of accountability vested in 
individual decision makers, which has been developed through an good understanding of 
boundaries of responsibility. Once apprised of the boundaries in which they work, staff are 
able to speak their mind on work-related matters, in a relatively unhindered fashion. While 
ultimate accountability is vested within the State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, the director 
and his staff are able to take responsibility for actions. For example, MRE, VA and 
Information Management departments are able to take decisions on matters relating to day-
to-day issues, as well as provide input into planning processes with other agencies.  
The NMAC is not specifically mandated for higher-level policy development, this is the 
responsibility of the National Mine Action Committee. The Committee includes 
representation from Civil Society organisations, e.g. the Sudan Campaign to Ban 
Landmines. However, for as long as the Committee does not meet regularly, direct public 
access to policy development will continue to be limited. This is not to say that public access 
to policy does not occur. State governors are able to influence the work plans of both the 
NMAC and the UNMAO, through a consultation process via the NMAC. Since tasks and 
requests are often of a political or developmental character rather than of an overtly 
humanitarian nature, a degree of interaction between local government and the community 
leaders within those states is reported to occur. That being said, instituting a formal 
mechanism of public access through civil society organisations, through the Committee 
would raise the effectiveness of public policy dialogue.  
There are limits to the degree that political influence over the technocratic process can be 
said to be beneficial. Owing to the political interest in mine action – defined through the CPA, 
and consolidated by its visibility and the large funding streams that support the programme – 
there is a high level of political interest. To-date, the developments may be seen as positive 
since they provide a counterbalance to the development-focussed priority-setting agenda of 
the NMAC as it takes the majority of its tasks from the Ministry of Transport Roads and 
Bridges. However, it may mean that decisions are not taken in the interests of 
humanitarianism, nor in terms of efficiency or effectiveness of operations. Although if the 
majority of high-to-medium humanitarian tasks in northern Sudan are cleared by 2014 this 
may not pose any particular problems.   
Recommendation: The NMAC should create an institutionalised knowledge 
management system, which ensures that skills and knowledge 
are not lost with reallocation of staff. This could include a 
system whereby changes to departmental staffing 
arrangements are staggered to ensure that employees can 
transfer skills between one another. It could also mean 
preparing documented handover notes. The creation of formal 
policies, systems and procedures that define the NMAC will 
also enhance continuity of service delivery. This is because 
personnel will need to refer to established systems and 
procedures rather than provide ad hoc solutions which may 
well vary in quality and consistency.  
Recommendation: The National Mine Action Committee should begin to 
reconvene regularly, and formal mechanisms for public policy 
dialogue should be established within NMAC systems and 
procedures. While the Committee will provide an oversight and 
accountability mechanism, as well as the opportunity for 
formalised civil society participation in the policy development 
process, more operational level systems and procedures that 
incorporate the views and opinions of beneficiaries and other, 
micro-level stakeholders will ensure that macro-level policy is 
being implemented in a just and equitable manner.  
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4.6 Assessment of current capacity: specific governance 
Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable the 
national authorities to regulate and manage mine action – the core business of a national 
authority. This part of the capacity assessment therefore defines the NMAC’s progress 
towards achieving the required levels of performance in the regulation and management of a 
mine action programme. 
4.6.1 Accreditation and quality 
Operations and quality assurance staff are comfortable discussing the purpose and wider 
aims of monitoring and evaluation operations in mine action. In addition they can make 
suggestions as to how currently accredited organisations do, or do not, represent good 
quality in terms of efficiency or effectiveness. It was clear from discussions that a nationally-
led accreditation process could become focused on the need to demonstrate organisational 
effectiveness and value for money.  
Staff appear familiar with the NTSGs. For example the MRE guidelines were viewed by 
national staff as being technically sufficient and fit for purpose. In addition the direct 
organisational links with the JIDUs through defence channels means that there is a feeling of 
operational understanding of the NTSGs. These factors imply that capacity exists to critically 
engage with the standards. What is lacking is an demonstrated ability (to external 
stakeholders) to ensure implementation of the NTSGs. However, the lack of evidence does 
not necessarily mean that there is a lack of capacity. There has been a traditional reluctance 
from the UNMAO to acknowledge the existence and operations of the JIDUs and thus no 
serious effort to understand their working practices. Nevertheless, the NMAC should be a 
position to take over the quality management and accreditation duties of the UNMAO, and in 
both areas of activity they are yet unproven.  
From a separate UN standpoint there is also no evidence that the NMAC has any intention 
of accrediting JIDUs. It is possible that if the Wau-Babanossa incident had not resulted in 
disengagement, UN agencies could have maintained enough leverage to persuade this to 
be otherwise. However, in the current absence of consensus on this matter – and a 
reluctance to discuss it openly – it may now remain to develop other forms of accountability 
system for both JIDU personnel and victims of negligence, such as through current 
legislation. 
Recommendation: Quality management staff within the NMAC should begin to 
demonstrate their familiarity with the NTSGs, to quality 
management staff within external agencies. In turn, external 
agencies such as the UNMAO should provide opportunities for 
creating interdependencies between quality management staff 
between the two organisations – potentially through a project-
based approach. 
Recommendation: Quality assurance staff should become involved in the process 
of accrediting and assuring quality on the current set of 
organisations conducting clearance in northern Sudan. This 
should be a gradual process that begins with basic training, 
secondments and field visits. Responsibilities should be 
gradually transferred, for example initially performing 
organisational accreditation in an assisted manner, then 
unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and 
unmonitored fashion. 
Recommendation: The NMAC should formalise and make explicit its position on 
the quality management and potential accreditation of the 
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JIDUs. Once accreditation and the processes that 
accreditation supports: protection for beneficiaries; confidence 
in performance; and protection for demining agencies, are 
understood, then external agencies and other stakeholders 
can begin to integrate into wider governance and judicial 
reform initiatives (e.g. a current UNDP programme of 
enhancing local level awareness of the justice system) 
4.6.2 Information management 
The current information management system within the NMAC is paper-based. This is 
consistent with the information management arrangements across other government 
departments. The capacity of the NMAC for actively managing information using sector 
specific databases such as the IMSMA is currently assessed to be low. This is said to be 
due to the low availability of military NMAC staff for training due to other work commitments. 
In addition, the requirement of NMAC IMSMA operators to travel from Khartoum to the 
UNMAO regional office in Kadugli where data entry for the northern sector takes place has 
exacerbated the difficulties in extensive training. 
Training on the operational use of IMSMA and the Quality Assurance database is conducted 
every year and this has had some impact. So while there is a better understanding of how to 
employ IMSMA in the field, there is little capacity for inputting and manipulating data, 
creating maps, conducting spatial analysis and extracting other types of data from the 
IMSMA. Because the IMSMA database is a live system and of such importance to all 
demining efforts in the country, national or otherwise, there is a reluctance to decentralise its 
management. This makes sense for operational reasons, as it ensures the quality of 
information in the database, but it does not necessarily provide the right conditions for 
access to for NMAC staff.  
Owing to ongoing sanctions on Sudan, there is also the issue of ownership of software for 
GIS. As it currently stands, the UNMAO is a custodian of the GIS software, however it is not 
allowed to transfer this to national ownership under the currently politico-security conditions 
currently in-force. 
Recommendation: The UNMAO should consider whether it is essential to continue 
to have data input for IMSMA at the Kadugli regional office. It is 
recommended to align operations and the information 
management centre of operations with those of the NMAC and 
the SSDC respectively; it is unlikely that the location of Kadugli 
represents as sustainable location for IMSMA data entry as 
neither the NMAC nor the SSDC are necessarily likely to 
continue to use it beyond the end of the mandate. The current 
system is a potential constraint to national performance in this 
area. 
Recommendation: IMSMA staff should become involved in the process inputting 
and managing data on the current set of organisations 
conducting clearance in southern Sudan. This should be a 
gradual process that begins with basic training and 
secondments followed by advanced courses. Responsibilities 
should be gradually transferred, for example initially managing 
data and creating graphical products in an assisted manner, 
then unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and 
unmonitored fashion.  
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Recommendation: The UNMAO IMSMA operators, in conjunction with their 
counterparts from the NMAC should begin investigating 
potential alternatives to the IMSMA system. These systems 
should be certified for use in northern Sudan (under current 
sanctions in-force on the country), and provide a sufficient level 
of information management capacity to sufficiently run mine 
action operations.  
4.6.3 Planning, tasking and resource mobilisation  
The primary development in terms of planning in Sudan for mine action is the development 
of the Multi-Year Work-Plan document. This plan is designed to demonstrate the attainment 
of obligations outlined under the Ottawa commitments over multiple years. It draws in all 
actors and main stakeholders in Sudan, and many different groups were involved in its 
development. The NMAC played a role in the development of the plan, but as of yet, they do 
not have ownership of the plan and at the time of writing, perceive it more as a UN-tool 
rather than a national one.  
Most other work-planning is on a yearly basis, there is also reactive project planning activity 
in response to political directives, e.g. clearance tasks in support of development or political 
processes. Plans involve substantive finance and logistics components, and they are 
demonstrated to be workable through the operation of the JIDUs. The NMAC staff are 
confident in their abilities to plan within the limits of the information and tools available to 
them. There is no demonstrated competency in using IMSMA to assist planning, however 
until the Landmine Impact Survey project is completed, the ability of both national and 
international agencies to task against impact is limited. 
The ability to task clearance organisations does not explicitly rest with the NMAC. JIDU 
activities are determined by the State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs who is chairman of the 
National Mine Action Committee, and operations are implemented directly through military 
channels. However, the NMAC does have the ability to adapt the requirement, and make 
suggestions for amending the clearance task. The NMAC has a monitoring and reporting 
role, rather than a direct tasking one. However, there is some tasking of national 
organisations within the MRE and VA pillars. 
With assistance from the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, the NMAC has been able to 
mobilise national resources for clearance tasks. Core funding for positions within the NMAC 
are also maintained through central financing processes, and these have generally been 
satisfactory. For as long as mine action remains relevant in Sudan, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the government budgets would not be able to support the core components of 
the NMAC. However, there will almost certainly be a requirement to lobby for increased 
external funding for specific clearance projects.  If the NMAC does not demonstrate value for 
money, professionalism and impact, it will not necessarily receive financial support from the 
government. External funding sources that have presented themselves as potential revenue 
streams include the Multi-Donor Trust Fund. 
Recommendation: Planning ability should be prioritised in the capacity 
development process. Staff should also be made aware of how 
to link their resource requirements to objectives, and be able to 
articulate needs to donors in a considered manner, i.e. a 
resource mobilisation strategy should be devised and 
implemented. The Multi-Year Work Plan is a suitable tool for 
training in this area, however it is critical that the principal 
authors of the plan take time to integrate the NMAC planning 
officers and senior managers into the process. 
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Recommendation: The NMAC should continue to lobby the government for 
financial support. This can be supported by UN agencies, by 
demonstrating the potential for NMAC performance both 
externally to donors and internally to other government 
departments. By encouraging the performance of the national 
authorities, the UN will improve their chances of sustainability. 
 
Notes to Section 3: 
21.  Under the terms of entry, organisations registered by the Humanitarian Aid Commission are entitled to bring 
equipment into the country without taxation, customs or other import duties. Under this arrangement these 
organisations are obliged to leave machines and other assets for the use of the Sudanese government. The 
UN operates under a different system and is not subject to the same conditionality. 
22.  The Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework, May 2006, Para 16 
23. Ibid., Para 22 (5) 
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY 
SECTION 5: ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT 
THE SOUTH SUDAN DEMINING COMMISSION/AUTHORITY 
5.1 Overview and entry level 
5.1.1 The SSDC is an independent government institution which reports directly to the 
Vice-Presidency. It is composed of five commissioners supported by a Director General who 
manages the Authority. The SSDC therefore represents a complex mix of institutional 
interests and as a result, the organisation is subject to strong political influence. Since the 
SPLM/A is the primary political and military force within the southern part of the country, 
there are significant linkages to the military, specifically the military engineering units and 
this is represented in the appointments of senior military officers to the commissioner posts. 
Like all other formal state structures in southern Sudan, the SSDC has been assembled from 
first principles. This has meant the creation of completely new roles and responsibilities for 
personnel within the organisation and the recruitment of staff, either directly across from 
SPLM/A, or from related organisations. 
5.1.2 At the first roundtable meeting, the management team from the SSDC felt it would be 
appropriate to use the human resource level as an entry point for analysis and assessment. 
There was a general consensus that organisational capacity is at the moment, merely the 
sum of the capabilities of each member of staff within the SSDC, and therefore an analysis 
of individual capabilities and performance would be more meaningful. As such, the 
performance appraisal of specific members of staff was used to elicit information of current 
capacity, predict future performance and thus establish capacity development priorities. To 
ensure continuity, a standard performance appraisal sheet prepared by the SSDC was used 
for the exercise. Performance appraisals were conducted for ten employees within the 
organisation. At the end of the performance appraisal process, a further roundtable 
discussion was held with the senior directing staff to discuss the initial findings and to agree 
the way ahead. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with staff throughout the 
organisation on an on-going basis. 
5.2 Future performance:  pillars of mine action 
This part of the capacity assessment defines the future requirements of each mine action 
pillar.  It describes the setting within which SSDC will be required to regulate and manage 
mine action in southern Sudan. 
5.2.1 Clearance  
The southern regions are the most heavily mined parts of the country and will thus continue 
to represent a clearance challenge for some time to come. The majority of the clearance 
operations have been road-clearance tasks that allow access for UN and other civilian 
vehicles, and future priorities will turn towards demining in support of impacted local 
communities. Clearance will require a growing national demining capacity. A large number of 
former humanitarian deminers are currently unemployed and they will be selected, refreshed 
and deployed within national organisations such as SIMAS, OSIL and SLR. A number of 
international organisations are also likely to be in-country. In addition, JIDU personnel draw 
military pay, and are provided with rations so they represent a sustainable option for 
clearance. They will be utilised after receiving assistance and support, for example in 
becoming accredited.  
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As the governmental focal point for demining, the SSDC will have a coordinating role for 
clearance operations and will be involved in the tasking of mine clearance organisations. It 
will lead a priority setting process within the southern Sudan Mine Action Working Group 
which is envisaged to be chaired by the SSDC. SSDC policy may well be impacted upon by 
a process of decentralisation of government authority to the state level – a process which is 
being undertaken throughout southern Sudan. From a centralisation perspective, there may 
be room for responding to joint policy directives from the National Mine Action Committee 
which is located in the North, and which has representation from SPLM ministers. This may 
prove difficult as the Committee rarely meets, and de facto has little influence. 
As part of its clearance-related responsibilities, the SSDC will lead on the development of 
procedures for making the hazardous area data in southern Sudan more realistic, and thus 
achievable. For example, the current survey data will be reviewed and augmented with more 
accurate surveys, as there is a pressing need for area reduction; impact data will be 
continually reviewed to take into account population migrations and development of 
communities. Procedures that support this process, for example a national standard for the 
handover of non-cleared land, which is consistent with the new IMAS 08.2024, will be 
developed. 
5.2.2 Mine Risk Education  
The principal MRE capacity will be trained school teachers who will deliver MRE to 
schoolchildren who will then bring awareness-raising messages home to parents and 
relatives. The goal is to achieve a completely mine-aware generation. In order to achieve 
this goal, MRE will have been completely mainstreamed into the curricula of standing 
educational programmes which are supervised by the Ministry of Education. The SSDC will 
provide on-going technical support to these mainstreamed initiatives. 
Not all impacted communities will have been identified by the Landmine Impact Survey and 
so a limited emergency capacity will be required to remain within the SSDC to support rapid 
deployment MRE operations. The SSDC will coordinate and oversee the implementation of 
MRE to these communities at risk, which will be identified on an as-needed basis. In support 
of this role, the MRE department will be responsible for creating MRE plans and strategies in 
partnership with national and international stakeholders. 
5.2.3 Stockpile Destruction  
While all known stocks of antipersonnel mines were destroyed in order to meet the 
obligations of the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), the potential for discovering significant 
numbers of abandoned caches means that more mines may still come to light. Stockpile 
destruction is seen as an ongoing process, which is closely linked to advocacy. The SSDC 
will need to continue lobbying senior military commanders to ensure that any new landmines 
that are discovered are reported, documented and destroyed. This mine action responsibility 
will thus require close coordination with the SPLA and the general security apparatus. 
5.2.4 Advocacy 
With a referendum on the horizon, there is the continued possibility that southern Sudan will 
choose to separate from the northern regions of the country. If such a situation is to occur, 
the issue of compliance with the MBT will also need to be addressed, as the current, single-
nation signature would be insufficient to meet the requirements of two nations. In the event 
of southern Sudan becoming an independent state then it may be necessary to advocate for 
the new Government to commit itself to signing the Treaty.  Were a new state to be formed, 
and were it to sign the MBT, then SSDC‟s responsibilities would shift from advocacy to 
supporting the new Government meet its obligations as a State Party to the Treaty. The 
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SSDC will be the governmental institution that would lead on the process of reaffirming 
commitment to the MBT. 
Although southern Sudan is currently held by the MBT with the SPLA previously committed 
under the Deed of Commitment for non-state actors, attitudes and behaviours are difficult to 
change, Agreement on the need to outlaw a military capacity such as landmines will not be 
total. Continued advocacy will be required to ensure that antipersonnel mines are not viewed 
as a legitimate choice of weapon. This will require building strong grass-roots support for the 
MBT. The SSDC would be assisted by the formation of a civil society body equivalent to a 
Southern Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines organisation that would act as a suitable 
pressure group. 
5.2.5 Victim Assistance 
By 2011, most VA activities will have been completely mainstreamed into other government 
departments. As these government departments develop and grow, they will begin to 
implement a wide range of general disability programmes which can better serve the needs 
and interests of disabled persons and their families. VA activities will continue to be steered 
by a working group, which includes the SSDC, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of 
Social Welfare.  
Although VA may become part of the mainstream social welfare system in the form of 
benefits and even compensation for injury, the SSDC will retain an oversight role on data 
collection, so that information on mine victims remains accurate, and that data can be used 
for both prioritisation and advocacy purposes. In addition, the VA department will scrutinise 
the development of all VA teaching aids and awareness raising materials, to ensure that they 
are compliant with international good practice, are sustainable and meet the needs of victims 
and their families. In addition, specific projects may be monitored to understand the range 
and numbers of beneficiaries, and the achievement of objectives. It is assumed that civil 
society organisations which recognise landmine victims will also have an important role in 
maintaining pressure on government to fully meet its obligations as a State Party to the Mine 
Ban Treaty. 
5.3 Future performance: specific governance 
Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable the 
national authorities to regulate and manage mine action.  These include organisational and 
operational accreditation, national mine action strategic planning and prioritisation, the 
mobilisation of resources, the management of mine action information management using 
IMSMA and the handover of safe, cleared land, i.e. through ensuring quality of operations. 
This part of the capacity assessment defines how the SSDC foresees discharging the 
activities that relative to the specific governance of its mine action programme. 
5.3.1 Accreditation and quality 
A large component of the SSDC mandate is the quality management of mine action, 
including the accreditation of mine action implementing organisations. The SSDC see quality 
management as a tool for enhancing service delivery, and accept that national mine action 
standards as integral to the conduct of operations. The SSDC will thus use a quality 
management system, including the accreditation of both international and national 
organisations and this will based on the existing National Technical Standards and 
Guidelines (NTSG). National standards that are based on IMAS represent a global 
consensus on best practice in mine action. So long as they do not interfere or conflict with 
national legislation, NTSGs provide a suitable mechanism for ensuring quality and 
accountability. However, the mechanisms for achieving full accreditation of all national 
 
5 November 2008 5 - 4 Chapter 5 (v2.4) 
organisations including the JIDUs will require a cooperative approach from external agencies 
who will aim to support – rather than limit – national efforts to participate.  
The SSDC accreditation processes will also be concerned with financial accountability of 
both NGOs and commercial organisations receiving both bilateral and multilateral funding, 
for example through the UNMAS-managed Voluntary Trust Fund. National authorities need 
to convince themselves of the value for money of clearance operations, and that they are 
consistent and aligned with national aims and objectives.  In addition to a review of standard 
operating procedures, the organisational accreditation may therefore also require interested 
organisations to submit details on experience, financing and so on. Following this, the IMAS-
model organisational accreditation would take place followed by an operational accreditation. 
The standard quality assurance mechanism will then be used to assess whether the 
organisation remains compliant with the NTSGs. The quality process will be managed by 
quality assurance officers who will monitor and evaluate all mine action activities for which 
the SSDC is responsible post transition.   
5.3.2 Information management  
As the coordinator for all mine action activities in southern Sudan, the SSDC will be 
supported by robust information management systems that are established within the SSDC. 
An IMSMA department supported by trained operators located in all regional offices will 
provide implementing partners and other interested groups with information on 
contamination. The SSDC will collate, analyse and manage the information in IMSMA using 
data collected by external organisations using standard proformas. Instead, it will store, 
manage and analyse the data. Usage of the GIS software element within the IMSMA system 
is not restricted within southern Sudan, thus the information management personnel within 
the SSDC see themselves as future custodians of the existing IMSMA database as it is 
currently constructed. 
5.3.3 Planning, tasking and resource mobilisation 
The SSDC will have a strategic plan with a vision, mission and strategic objectives of mine 
action in southern Sudan and have a developed understanding of how these objectives will 
be met.  This could include integrating with the Multi-Year Work-Plan, but this will not negate 
the need for further work-planning for specific departments and technical functions such as 
MRE.   
Work on stockpile destruction will remain an ongoing process of reporting both 
internationally to the States Parties to the MBT, and nationally to the national security 
apparatus. As most activity in this area will be reactive activity on discovery of caches of 
landmines there is reduced requirement for long-term planning activity in this area. For MRE 
and VA, planning and tasking will be conducted within relevant departments in partnership 
with Operations and SSDC Commissioners and the Director General. Planning may also 
involve interested governmental and civil society stakeholders, as well as representation 
from international organisations such as UNICEF. 
International organisations will be required to have their mine action activities coordinated, 
and will be specifically tasked by the SSDC who will distribute task identification numbers 
and provide certificates of cleared land. The SSDC will have an effective, transparent and 
accountable system for issuing and evaluating tenders, awarding contracts and monitoring 
compliance. With the exception of special projects such as JIDU operations, clearance 
planning is likely to follow the status quo of separate North-South operational work-planning. 
Work will be coordinated by an Operations Department which will contribute to yearly work-
plans which can also be used to solicit government funding. Aside from clearance, activities 
within the plans may include development of capacity within the SSDC.  
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In terms of resource mobilisation, core funding for the SSDC will continue to come from the 
government Donations for equipment, facilities development and up-keep, will be solicited 
from international partners such as UNDP, wherever possible. Foreign governments will be 
encouraged to support mine action in Sudan, although it is accepted that the majority of 
external funding will continue to be on a bilateral basis directly from donors or multilaterally-
sourced and managed by the UN. In general, national sources of funding will be tied to the 
perceived political importance of mine action, and the economic fortunes of the country. 
5.4 Assessment of current capacity:  programme and project management 
Following the analysis of the SSDC’s future capacity requirements across the pillars of mine 
action, an assessment is required to establish those areas of performance that can be 
enhanced through intervention. The purpose of this assessment section is to those identify 
areas of need, by making a review of actual, current performance across the critical 
functional capacities at the SSDC.  
Anticipated future performance reveals a need for supporting advocacy activity, strong 
coordination mechanisms, and the ability to plan, monitor and evaluate operations. This will 
require organisational competency to engage with a wide range of stakeholders, assess 
needs and create common visions for mine action (including advocacy for the MBT) and 
develop suitable policies and effective strategies. At a more operational level, the SSDC will 
need to be able to manage its own activities and initiatives as well monitor and evaluate the 
projects and programmes of others.  
5.4.1 Engaging with stakeholders 
The SSDC is developing linkages with national stakeholders including state governors, and 
these parties have a significant input into the current mine action prioritisation process. 
Engagement is enabled through formal mechanisms such as the Mine Action Working 
Group, as well as through informal networks of contacts. These are characteristically 
nascent arrangements due to the recent establishment of the southern Government in 
general and a corresponding lack of awareness of the purpose and practice of mine action.  
In the civil society sphere, the benefits of symbiosis between civil society and the state is an 
idea that is specifically articulated within the SSDC and there is every indication that future 
relationships will be harmonious; the SSDC appears to perform well in terms of engaging 
with national NGOs. The perceived role of self-organised advocacy and pressure groups, 
and their interaction with government are western-democratic in outlook, and it suggests that 
cooperation and coordination with these entities will be effective. 
Relationships with the principal external stakeholder, UNMAO mission, has been mostly 
strained or non-existent. This reflects a lack of willingness as well as capacity, to engage 
effectively on both sides. The result for the SSDC has been a reduced consistency and effort 
in supporting, chairing and organising multi-stakeholder meetings, such as monthly 
coordination meetings. It is not the purpose of this report to provide in-depth reasons for 
reticence regarding collaboration and equitable decision-making with government, however it 
may stem from (1) a lack of interdependency in work processes, (2) an emergency response 
culture that pervades the UN mission, (3) leadership style incompatibility, (4) a desire to 
avoid duplication of roles, and (5) perceived constraints arising from cooperation. The lack of 
positive synergy and partnership represents one of the biggest constraints to deliberate 
efforts for capacity development of the SSDC. 
Recommendation: The relevant SSDC technical personnel should be present in 
negotiations and dialogue with GOSS that relates to mine 
action. The SSDC feel that they have been sidelined by 
international agencies, e.g. in VA, and in the interests of good 
 
5 November 2008 5 - 6 Chapter 5 (v2.4) 
relationships, and fostering partnership, it is important not to 
exacerbate tensions. If necessary interaction with SSDC 
should become a formal policy instituted by the GOSS, and 
where necessary supported by facilitating legislation. However, 
the SSDC is strongly advised to develop a consistent approach 
to organising, supporting and chairing meetings and working 
groups. 
 
Recommendation:  Engagement with the SSDC should not be viewed as a 
constraint to be avoided. As the governmental focal point for 
mine action in southern Sudan, emphasis should be placed on 
creating genuine partnerships between UNMAO the SSDC. 
This will require proactive attempts to foster equitable 
relationships. Likewise, the SSDC should understand the 
operational limitations, and an emergency-phase „culture‟ 
within UN organisations that have previously limited concerted 
capacity development. They should also recognise current 
willingness on behalf of the UN for engagement and should 
capitalise on continued opportunities for creating 
interdependencies.  
5.4.2 Assessing needs and building visions 
Terms of reference (job descriptions) for all staff have been drafted, and a performance 
appraisal system has been instituted. Most employees are generally aware of the need to 
further develop their own knowledge, understanding and skills to enable them to improve 
their own competencies and capabilities, and thus improve the performance of the SSC/A. At 
an organisational level, departments are seen to be lacking in core functionality although no 
comprehensive needs assessment has taken place of organisational performance. Within 
the institutional environment, the SSDC is also able to identify constraints and opportunities 
that impact on capacity and performance.  
In terms of conducting needs assessment to support sound planning, discussions with staff 
reveal that refugee movements, suspected levels of contamination, past coverage of 
operations, and ongoing development activities should all guide prioritisation in some way. 
However, the needs assessment process is largely intuitive, informal and lacks consistency; 
there is little access to data, and knowledge of how to manipulate it. There is strong 
commitment to future usage of empirical sources of data such as the Landmine Impact 
Survey and planning processes which are rooted in a firm response to need. Within all 
cases, priority is placed very much within impacted communities. The MRE and VA officers 
at the UNMAO have provided some assistance in developing capacity in this area, and the 
responsible manager for these areas at the SSDC feels that he has gained some limited 
understanding of certain planning processes. However, there has been no consistent and 
sustained attempt to integrate the MRE/VA manager and staff into the needs assessment 
and planning process – they are invited to attend, rather than trained to lead these events. 
This is a situation which has been aggravated by the separation of site between the UNMAO 
and SSDC offices. 
While needs identify the direction in which a public-service organisation should move, 
leadership is required to move it. The leadership arrangement within the SSDC is complex. 
Technocratic decision making, as opposed to political decision making, is invested within the 
Authority element of the SSDC, which is currently headed by an acting Director General. 
Decisions that have political ramifications are addressed by the group of five commissioners: 
a chairperson, a deputy chairperson and three members. These persons may consult on any 
technical matters that they feel appropriate. The commissioner positions are political 
appointments, and there is thus a strong influence of politics on technical matters. In the 
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absence of completely formalised reporting lines, and with an organisational structure that 
can still be considered formative, this may be confusing to lower level staff, who seek clear 
guidance and direction. It may also give rise to decision-making processes – which although 
are consensual – may take some time to come about as heads of department seek to clarify 
what they can and cannot do within a complex political context, even on lower-level and 
technical issues. 
In terms of leadership styles, there is an open and cordial atmosphere maintained between 
junior and senior staff. At performance appraisals, junior and mid-level staff are encouraged 
to identify problems and issues within their parts of the organisation and are happy to 
engage in constructive criticism. This being said, the majority of senior appointments are 
military appointments, and this has its own influence on organisational culture. The result is 
that while there is an air of participation, and multi-dimensional feedback, decision-making is 
a top-down process. There is thus a centralised management approach which may not 
necessarily encourage high performance in complex, multi-stakeholder activities such as 
mine action. 
Recommendation: External agencies should recognise the political environment in 
which the SSDC operates, and understand that capacity 
development practices requiring rapid institutional changes will 
not work. Changes will come about through influence, rather 
than direct instruction alone and this will be determined by the 
quality of working relationship, for example through 
experiential trust developed through interdependency.  
Recommendation:  The UNMAO IMSMA and planning components should attempt 
to integrate SSDC counterparts into their planning processes, 
throughout all stages including needs assessments – not 
simply on data consolidation and for approval of work-plans. 
SSDC should be exposed to the entire process of using needs 
to conduct spatial analysis to develop objectives and 
subsequently derive action plans. 
Recommendation: The commissioners should attempt to create a formal policy 
framework within which the Authority may operate. This will 
free up time for the commissioners for higher-level matters, will 
create clear boundaries of responsibility and will allow senior to 
mid-level managers to make swifter decisions and judgement 
calls. 
5.4.3 Developing policy and strategy 
At a project level, the framework approach to planning is relatively well understood in 
principal by some but not all senior managers; but there is limited evidence that it is used in 
practice. Directing staff are able to articulate the specific aim and mission of the SSDC; there 
is familiarity with a range of techniques for developing policies and strategies. This is 
perhaps attributable to the participatory approaches employed on a range of training courses 
that cover programme and project management, and the previous work experience of these 
senior staff in development-related fields. There is evidence to suggest that these 
approaches will become normative to the southern Sudanese government institutions, which 
are being developed along the principles of management within which, programmes of 
results-based projects are well-used. However, within departments themselves, planning 
ability is very weak. Some staff do not appear accustomed to thinking at a strategic 
timeframe, and there is a lack of clarity as to the core components of a plan and how they 
may be derived. 
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It is unclear how far in advance operational work-planning will extend, current budgeting 
systems suggest on a yearly basis. Policy and strategy development principles such as 
ensuring participation are not articulated, yet formal mechanisms – such as the Mine Action 
Working Group, and the multi-stakeholder yearly prioritisation process – are in place to 
ensure a degree of participation is embedded within the process. Prioritisation policy and 
strategy for clearance operations will be coordinated by the SSDC, with input from the Mine 
Action Working Group which will include agencies such as the Ministry of Transport, Roads 
and Bridges. In addition, although there has been some MRE and operations input (e.g. into 
the yearly prioritisation process), there have been inconsistent opportunities for building 
capacity within the SSDC with respect to planning. 
Recommendation: External agencies should capitalise on the consistency 
between planning approaches accepted by the SSDC, and 
their own, and begin to draw SSDC staff into the mainstream 
planning process. For example, the SSDC should be given the 
time and space to understand the Multi-Year Work Plan, and 
then the opportunity to engage critically within it, on a power-
neutral basis.  
Recommendation: Ensure that formal participatory mechanisms become 
completely normative. This includes all multi-stakeholder 
consultancy processes that are currently managed by the 
UNMAO. This will help to ensure that future SSDC 
mechanisms and processes are participatory in practice.  
5.4.4 Budgeting, managing and implementing 
Accountancy and budget control is managed through the Administration and Finance 
department. However actual budget and occasional, supplementary budget development is 
conducted by the senior directing staff within the SSDC. For the current year, the SSDC has 
a budget of approximately $1.5 million. This implies an ability to mobilise a relatively large 
amount national resources. There is also financial assistance towards facilities and transport 
that is provided by UNDP, but in general there are large shortfalls in equipment such as 
computers and vehicles, as well as for allowances for staff to travel to regional offices. The 
lack of equipment and travel budget continues to pose a significant institutional constraint to 
capacity development.  
For the funds that it controls, the SSDC is able to prepare budgets for travel and subsistence 
allowances for personnel. Officers within the finance department display an interest in their 
work, and have an understanding of what they still need to achieve in terms of personal 
career development. For example, accounting principles and budget control are understood 
at a basic level, yet there is a recognised need to be able to enhance performance in these 
areas, as well as adding extra competencies such as financial planning. There is thus a 
nascent competency in developing budgets and managing expenditure. 
In terms of human resource management, the SSDC is covered by a range of government 
policies and labour laws. However, there is sometimes lack of clarity on which regulations on 
general labour policy hold – central governmental or local organisational – and this is likely 
to continue until the government systems become more mainstreamed. Labour regulations 
do not include centralised recruitment of new staff. Recruitment and selection is conducted 
by the SSDC, through a formal selection process: job notices are well advertised locally, 
recruitment notices are played on the radio, interviews are held, and selection is made. 
There is a genuine desire amongst senior staff to manage in accordance with established 
“western” principals. Yet while there is a developed understanding amongst some senior 
Commissioners and similar grades within the Authority, these ideas have not been obviously 
communicated to more junior staff.   
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The SSDC does not claim to be an implementing agency. However it participates in planning 
and in the tasking of some national NGOs, for example, MRE in conjunction with UNICEF 
and UNMAO. For the limited operational tasking processes in SSDC – for the current scope 
of work – the Operations Department has responsibility for tasking. They are supported by 
the Administration and Finance department, and a Logistics section. Logistical support within 
the SSDC has only very basic operational competency which includes storekeeping, 
purchasing of sundries, and the maintenance of simple records on equipment such as 
computers which are held at the SSDC premises. There is no claimed ability for fleet 
management, storage of large amounts of equipment or maintenance and care of large-
scale facilities. 
Recommendation: There are specific human-resource level actions that can be 
immediately implemented to provide capacity development 
“quick wins”. For example, self-identified opportunities for 
personal career development which are achievable and 
reasonable can be supported25; and which were identified 
through the performance review process.  
Recommendation: External agencies should attempt to conduct concerted 
organisational development of the Administration and Finance 
Department within the SSDC. This should include improving 
performance in accountancy and book-keeping as well as 
preparing and managing budgets. 
Recommendation: External agencies should attempt to conduct concerted 
organisational development of the Logistics Department within 
the SSDC. Activities should be harmonised with the controlled 
growth of the SSDC fleet of cars, facilities and the type and 
amount of equipment in the stores. 
Recommendation: The UNMAO officers in charge of MRE and VA, should 
continue to provide assistance in terms of planning support to 
the SSDC. As far as possible, SSDC staff should also be 
involved in the management, monitoring and evaluation 
activities associated with these plans. Where possible the 
SSDC should also make assets available so that their staff can 
work with external agencies.  
Recommendation: The lack of funds for equipment such as computers and 
vehicles means that there is a natural constraint to operations, 
as well as capacity development activities. As a matter of 
some urgency, the SSDC (with UNDP) should make an 
inventory of required equipment, which is rationalised against 
sound planning assumptions. Wherever possible, external 
agencies should attempt to solicit the required equipment and 
provide it in a controlled and sustained manager that is 
appropriate for a combined improvement of performance with 
growth.  
5.4.5 Monitoring and evaluation  
As an institution designed for supervision and coordination, the SSDC sees monitoring and 
evaluation as a core component of its work. Senior staff view the standardised IMAS-based 
approach, i.e. use of the NTSGs, as the basis for discussions on quality. However, there is 
some confusion amongst lower level staff as to who should be accrediting demining 
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organisations working in southern Sudan – they see duplication of their roles within the UN 
and have questions regarding the purposes of the two organisations. 
Within the functional departments, there is little demonstrated knowledge of the utility of 
classical monitoring and evaluation systems for projects that are designed to generate social 
impacts, such as MRE or VA. Participatory approaches to evaluation and the subsequent, 
beneficial outcomes of accountability, learning and capacity development are not explicitly 
recognised.   
Recommendation: Skills and knowledge for monitoring and evaluation should be 
transferred to those VA, MRE and other project-based staff 
working towards external, social goals. Basic tools and 
techniques should be supplemented with supporting 
information on how participatory evaluation can be used to 
heighten accountability, ensure learning and improve capacity. 
5.5 Assessment of current capacity: general governance  
General governance refers to the broader environment which enables the specific 
governance systems, processes and procedures to be developed and applied. The purpose 
of this part of the assessment of current capacity is to outline the general governance 
environment within the SSDC, in terms of facilitating or constraining future performance, and 
the permissiveness towards intervention and positive change.  
Decades of conflict means that like most organisations in southern Sudan, the SSDC has 
faced considerable difficulties in finding competent staff.  Governmental positions are not as 
well paid as similar positions within commercial or international organisations, and this has 
added to the difficulties. For purposes of expediency and perhaps political necessity, a range 
of executive appointments were made when the commission was established. At that time 
the SPLA was the only credible pseudo-governmental organisation operating in the country 
and most of the commissioners were drawn across from the military. Since the military 
commissioners are all of a relatively senior rank, it reflects the political importance attached 
to these positions. Senior non-military staff were selected on the basis of experience within 
mine action, or knowledge of socio-economic development programmes.  More recently, 
selection procedures for later staff hires, are formalised and presumably meritocratic. 
Employment notices, interview processes, and the public announcement of successful 
candidates are a critical step towards institutionalising a rational-legal organisation that 
ensures efficiency and effectiveness. Performance appraisal activities, which are still 
formative and ad hoc, are also an important addition for staff development and promotion 
within the SSDC. 
The mixture of military personnel and civilian professionals, sometimes gives rise to 
contradictory organisational culture in which liberal, new-management practices and ideas 
are enforced with top-down executive authority. This is facilitated by a hybrid organisational 
structure that has merged the Commission with the Authority26. This convergence of 
organisations is not merely physical, but culturally embedded in terms of organisational 
values, attitudes and beliefs.  A classical, policy-forming Mine Action Authority creates the 
political space for technical service delivery by a Mine Action Centre, and automatically 
produces a natural vertical accountability mechanism between the two organisations. 
However, the current political/technical mandate of SSDC is amorphous, and the 
accountability mechanism is decentralised across multiple locations within the organisation. 
The result is that decision making processes can become obfuscated and technical 
decisions may quickly become political. In the current security climate, there may be good 
justification for keeping mine action matters close to the attention of politico-military 
organisations such as the SPLA. Yet under future conditions of peace and prosperity, 
decision making would become needlessly hampered.   
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Recommendation: Continue on the current path of meritocratic recruitment. 
Performance appraisals should be applied to senior directing 
staff as well as mid-to-junior level staff within the Authority.  
Political appointments of commissioners will be complemented 
by a growing appreciation of mine action, and the increasing 
technical competency of the Authority itself.  
Recommendation:  As far as possible, the Commissioners should try to create a 
formalised and well-understood political framework, within 
which the technical departments within the Authority can 
operate. This will greatly facilitate decision-making and 
increase the potential for rapid service delivery. 
5.6 Assessment of current capacity: specific governance 
Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable the 
national authorities to regulate and manage mine action – the core business of a national 
authority. This part of the capacity assessment therefore defines the SSDC’s progress 
towards achieving the required levels of performance in the regulation and management of a 
mine action programme. 
5.6.1 Accreditation and quality 
Apart from the some individuals on the senior directing staff, operations and quality 
assurance staff are not yet comfortable discussing the purpose and wider aims of monitoring 
and evaluation operations in mine action. Quality assurance and operations staff are 
unfamiliar with the NTSGs, and this can be attributed to a lack of skills and knowledge of 
mine action activities. This may also be due to a lack of awareness of the purpose of 
standards in general and IMAS in particular. This is not helped by a lack of equipment and 
facilities which would allow participation in field activities, and this is due to a lack of funding. 
Quality assurance performance is also hampered by the fact that the SSDC are not currently 
responsible for accreditation in practice. 
Recommendation: Quality Assurance staff should become involved in the process 
of accrediting and assuring quality on the current set of 
organisations conducting clearance in southern Sudan. This 
should be a gradual process that begins with basic training, 
secondments and field visits. Responsibilities should be 
gradually transferred, for example initially performing 
organisational accreditation in an assisted manner, then 
unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and 
unmonitored fashion. In order to support this process, it is 
strongly recommended that the SSDC ensure that Quality 
Assurance staff gain a comprehensive knowledge of mine 
action. In addition to manual demining, this should include 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), mechanical demining, 
and use of mine detection dogs.  
5.6.2 Information management 
The current information management system within the SSDC is paper-based, although 
middle and senior-level staff communicate using email. The capacity of the SSDC for 
actively managing information using sector specific databases such as IMSMA is currently 
assessed to be generally very low, although potential for doing so rests with some 
employees. 
 
5 November 2008 5 - 12 Chapter 5 (v2.4) 
Training on the operational use of IMSMA and the Quality Assurance database is conducted 
every year and this has had some impact. Certain staff are able to open IMSMA, locate 
dangerous areas and extract a limited amount of data. One staff member with a more 
developed understanding is able to check on the accuracy of information in the database 
relating to his region of operations, and occasionally reports discrepancies to the UNMAO 
IMSMA department. So while there is a better understanding of how to employ IMSMA in the 
field, there is no demonstrated capacity for inputting and manipulating data, creating maps, 
conducting spatial analysis and extracting other types of data from the IMSMA.  
Because the IMSMA database is a live system and of such importance to all demining efforts 
in the country, national or otherwise, there is a reluctance to decentralise its management. 
This makes sense for operational reasons, as it ensures the quality of information in the 
database, but it does not necessarily provide the right conditions for access to for SSDC 
staff. This is especially the case since the UNMAO IMSMA staff and SSDC offices are now 
some distance apart. 
Recommendation: IMSMA staff should become involved in the process inputting 
and managing data on the current set of organisations 
conducting clearance in southern Sudan. This should be a 
gradual process that begins with basic training and 
secondments followed by advanced courses. Responsibilities 
should be gradually transferred, for example initially managing 
data and creating graphical products in an assisted manner, 
then unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and 
unmonitored fashion. 
Recommendation:  The UNMAO should consider whether it is essential to 
continue to have data input for IMSMA at the Kadugli regional 
office. It is recommended to align operations and the 
information management centre of operations with those of the 
NMAC and the SSDC respectively; it is unlikely that the 
location of Kadugli represents as sustainable location for 
IMSMA data entry as neither the NMAC nor the SSDC will 
continue to use it beyond the end of the mandate.  
5.6.3 Planning, tasking and resource mobilisation  
The primary development in terms of planning in Sudan for mine action is the development 
of the Multi-Year Work-Plan document. This plan is designed to demonstrate the attainment 
of obligations outlined under the Ottawa commitments over multiple years. It draws in all 
actors and main stakeholders in Sudan, and many different groups were involved in its 
development. The SSDC played a role in the development of the plan, but as of yet, they do 
not have ownership of the plan and at the time of writing, and perceive it more as a UN-tool 
rather than a national one.  
Staff throughout the SSDC show an appreciation of the concepts of contamination and 
impact, and there is an agreement that landmine impacted communities are the basis from 
which planning and prioritisation should take place. However, there is no demonstrated 
competency in using empirical data in planning processes. However until the Landmine 
Impact Survey project is completed, the ability of both national and international agencies to 
task against impact is limited. In terms of other planning approaches, there is limited 
competency particularly in being able to link resource requirements to specific objectives; 
staff members are aware of their limitations. 
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Despite the general lack of planning ability, the SSDC is keen to begin tasking agencies. 
However in without access and control of the IMSMA system it is unable to assign agencies 
with task identification numbers; in the absence of a credible quality management system, it 
is also unable to provide clearance certificates. The result is that despite a will for tasking, 
and an apparent compliance on the part of certain international implementing partners to 
engage with the SSDC on a tasking and certification basis, it will require skills development 
in planning and quality assurance and access to specific IT tools to undertake this role. 
However, outside the traditional, UN-led tasking system, the SSDC has input into the tasking 
of JIDU operations in areas that are of joint northern-southern control, or indeed clearance in 
southern areas.  
Core funding for positions within the SSCD/A is maintained through central financing 
processes. However, financing does not appear to be sufficient enough to remove certain 
key organisational constraints such as lack of transport. While mine action remains relevant, 
there is no evidence to suggest that the government budgets would not be able to support 
the core component of the SSDC. Government organisations such as the JIDUs are already 
funded with soldiers drawing salaries from military sources. The SSDC thus views the JIDUs 
as a sustainable clearance option, and an asset that should be used to expand clearance 
operations. The SSDC is thus able mobilise a certain amount of funding from national  
budgets, and that in terms of clearance options there is a partially-funded national clearance 
asset available for use. These two factors imply a level of financial sustainability. There is 
also no indication that international financial support would completely dissipate on the 
departure of the UN mission. Agencies such as UNDP will still be available to continue 
providing support, and the Voluntary Trust Fund may also receive ear-marked funds for 
Sudan. Individual donors with specific interests in the development of national capacity may 
also choose to continue funding SSDC development and other national operations.  
Recommendation: Priority should be placed on generating advance 
understanding of the purpose and potentials of the Multi-Year 
Work-Plan; the SSDC senior staff should understand how they 
can engage with the plan and use it as a tool for eliminating 
impact, developing their own capacity, engaging with other 
stakeholders, and mobilising resources. Understanding how to 
link empirical data on need to the allocation of assets over time 
is a critical activity. Planning ability should be prioritised in the 
capacity development process, across all departments. Staff 
should also be made aware of how to link their resource 
requirements to objectives, and be able to articulate needs to 
donors in a considered manner. 
Recommendation: IMSMA and Quality Assurance capacity should receive 
particular attention within the capacity development process. 
Without these skills and abilities, the SSDC cannot begin 
tasking and issuing clearance certificates.  
Recommendation: The SSDC should continue to lobby the government for 
financial support. This work should be linked in with future 
advocacy initiatives designed to draw public attention – and 
thus public pressure – to the dangers of antipersonnel 
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Notes on Section 5: 
24. This IMAS is yet to be formally endorsed by the IMAS Steering Committee 
25.  For example, this capacity assessment process identified a night-school accountancy course available in 
Juba, at a cost of approximately $600. 
26. This can loosely be considered to represent a combined Mine Action Authority with a Mine Action Centre as 
they are classical conceived 
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY 
SECTION 6: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES 
6.1 Introduction 
The gap between the current capacities of NMAC and SSDC, and the required future needs 
of the Sudan Mine Action Programme, was discussed in Sections 4 and 5.  The 
recommendations provide a list of issues which need to be addressed and actions which 
need to be taken. 
The recommendations were discussed with NMAC, SSDC and UNMAO, and from these 
discussions the recommendations were grouped into themes. These themes include: (1) 
specific activities to be undertaken by the national authorities and external agencies, such as 
developing policy and legislation, and (2) principles of good practice that cross-cut across all 
activities such as the development of collaboration. These themes were then arranged as 
priorities under three categories: the enabling environment, organisational capacity and the 
development of human resources. In order to develop a realistic capacity development plan, 
not every recommendation has been integrated into the list of priorities.  
6.2 Enabling environment priorities 
The enabling environment includes Government Ministries, civil society, international 
organisations and other entities which can influence the way in which the NMAC, SSDC and 
UNMAO can regulate and manage mine action in Sudan. 
Priority is being given to actions which will enable the development of national capacities 
and will encourage the rapid transfer of regulatory and management responsibilities from the 
United Nations to national authorities.  
Priority One Improve existing systems and procedures for the regulation and 
coordination of mine action in Sudan, and enable capacity 
development and transition to full national ownership 
The UN Mine Action Steering Committee in Sudan represents a 
suitable oversight mechanism within the UN system; aside from 
setting an example of good practice, it provides the most appropriate 
forum for development of a common position on transition, and the 
best oversight and accountability mechanism for implementation of the 
process. It should oversee organisational changes as the UNMAO 
itself transitions from managing emergency post-conflict mine action to 
an arrangement where mine action is undertaken in support of 
nationally-led reconstruction and development. 
The National Mine Action Committee (which forms part of Sudan‟s 
NMAA) represents the most appropriate national mechanism for (1) 
creating interdependency between northern and southern 
programmes, (2) ensuring input from civil society into formal policy 
development, and (3) ensuring that the national authorities meet their 
objectives in a justifiable and technically defensible manner. UN 
agencies and national authorities should encourage the Committee to 
reconvene and meet on a regular basis.  
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Priority Two Change the role of international staff from regulating the 
programme and managing projects to assisting, advising and 
mentoring national managers 
As the emphasis changes from supporting UNMIS and emergency 
mine action to the development of national capacities, UNMAO staff 
need to become more actively engaged in developing 
interdependencies with their national counterparts. Engagement must 
be on a power-neutral basis that recognises the sovereignty of the 
national government. Since interdependencies have not evolved 
naturally, they will need to be supported by formal organisational 
policy and directives. These should include a well promoted policy on 
engagement with the national authorities for all those mine action 
activities which are not explicitly in support of UNMIS, i.e. 
humanitarian tasks, or tasks funded through multilateral sources, 
provided for humanitarian mine action in Sudan.  
Priority Three Develop national legislation which allows the national authorities 
to regulate and coordinate mine action organisations and 
activities 
 NMAC and SSDC currently draw authority for their work from the CPA 
and Presidential Decree 299, although neither document will provide 
the two organisations with the mandate to regulate and coordinate 
mine action activities post 2011.  In particular, the legal status of 
SSDC is unclear. 
 National legislation should be developed as a matter of urgency. It 
should clarify inter alia the role and responsibilities of a central 
National Mine Action Authority and its two national Mine Action 
Coordination Centres (NMAC and SSDC), and the role of the NMAO 
as trustee of certain regulatory functions.  Legislation should also 
address issues such as the implementation of relevant international 
treaty obligations, the development and maintenance of national mine 
action standards, the accreditation and monitoring of mine action 
operators, and the extent of liability for accidents caused by mines and 
ERW. 
 The development of national legislation should draw on the 
experience of proven legislation in other mine-affected countries. 
Priority Four UN agencies should understand better the resource constraints 
in which the national authorities work, and address the 
transparency issues that hamper partnerships 
 There is a significant imbalance in the funding made available to the 
UNMAO and the funding of NMAC and SSDC.  This is partly due to 
the UNMAO‟s role in supporting the well-funded UNMIS mission, but it 
also reflects a deliberate decision to channel most funds through the 
UN system rather than through the Government of Sudan. If the 
national authorities are to play a meaningful role alongside the 
UNMAO, then the UN should place greater emphasis on developing 
opportunities for supporting NMAC and SSDC by providing more 
resources where possible and where appropriate.  
To improve the current situation, the national authorities should be 
encouraged to release information on financing; demonstrating how 
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nationally-sourced funds are allocated within the national demining 
effort will demonstrate sound financial management and will 
encourage donors to support nationally-led initiatives. Since finances 
are currently a point of contention, UNMAS (via implementing agency 
UNOPS) should consider releasing the value of demining contracts on 
the UNOPS website, along with other contracts that have values 
above $100,00027.  
Priority Five Institutionalise the use the Multi-Year Work-Plan (MYWP) as a 
sectoral device for supporting national capacity development;  
 The MYWP defines the UNMAS-managed mine action portfolio for 
Sudan. It enables donors to understand the UN‟s priority for funding in 
support of the programme‟s strategic goals, and places capacity 
development projects alongside other complementary requirements.  
The MYWP includes tools for monitoring progress, and as such is 
suitable for charting the development of national capacity and the 
progress of transition.  
Priority Six Link mine action capacity development to wider development 
strategies and approaches 
 Capacity development of the national authorities should clearly 
demonstrate linkages to other important development programmes 
and initiatives such as the UN Development Assistance Framework 
and the UNDP Country Plan for Sudan. This is consistent with the 
principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and will assist 
in demonstrating macro-development outcomes, and progress in 
meeting goals such as the Millennium Development Goals.  
6.3 Organisational priorities 
The following priorities are aimed at improving the ability of the NMAC and SSDC to regulate 
and manage mine action in Sudan.  
Priority One Raise the quality management capacity of the national 
authorities, so that they can accredit organisations, quality 
assure operations, and certify cleared land 
Accreditation and quality assurance are two key functions of national 
mine action authorities. Both NMAC and SSDC should become 
involved in the process of awarding organisational and operational 
accreditation to demining organisations who can demonstrate they are 
able to conduct technical survey and clearance effectively and safely 
in Sudan. NMAC and SSDC should also become involved in 
conducting quality assurance of organisations during survey and 
clearance, and conducting post-clearance quality control to allow 
cleared land to be handed over to local authorities and land 
owners/users in accordance with national standards. These regulatory 
responsibilities should be transferred from UNMAO to the national 
authorities in a timely and controlled fashion, allowing the national 
authorities to develop the necessary systems, procedures, knowledge 
and skills, and to assume responsibility in a sustainable manner. 
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Priority Two Improve information management capacity within the national 
authorities so that they can support mine action operations 
through better planning and operational support 
Capacity within the national authorities should be developed so that 
they can undertake the process of inputting, managing, and 
manipulating data provided by organisations conducting clearance in 
Sudan. In the South this should be based on the IMSMA system, in 
the North where the GIS components of IMSMA is currently restricted 
due to US trade embargo on Sudan, training should take place on the 
IMSMA system, but alternative mechanisms of manipulating the data 
in a spatial manner should be investigated. Responsibilities should be 
gradually transferred, for example initially managing data and creating 
graphical products in an assisted manner, then unassisted but 
monitored, until finally in an unassisted and unmonitored fashion.  
[Note:  it is understood that FMS - the developers of IMSMA - are 
close to getting agreement with US authorities to license IMSMA for 
use in northern Sudan.] 
Priority Three Ensure efficient and effective administration and logistics 
systems are in place, and ensure transparent and appropriate 
financial systems are developed 
One of the key problems in Sudan has been the difficulty in providing 
timely and effective logistical support to demining operations. 
However, logistical support capacity within the national authorities is 
currently only rudimentary. There is no claimed ability to manage 
fleets of vehicles, store large amounts of equipment, or maintain large-
scale facilities. If the national authorities are to become a viable 
coordination mechanism, effective and efficient logistical support is 
required to manage fleets of vehicles, facilities and equipment. 
Likewise, the quality of administrative support for activities (including 
human resource management) within the national authorities is 
variable; in the North, over-reliance on paper-driven systems and in 
the South a general lack of capacity. Finally, financial systems are 
normative to the overarching bureaucratic framework, so while they 
cannot be completely overhauled, they can be streamlined to 
demonstrate greater levels of effectiveness, efficiency, and 
accountability to the Government of Sudan and potential donors.  
6.4 Human resource level priorities 
The following priorities are aimed at improving the competencies if managers within NMAC 
and SSDC to regulate and manage mine action in Sudan. 
Priority One Ensure that formal training, coaching and mine action exchange 
activities are offered only to managers who well benefit from 
such opportunities 
 Senior managers from the national authorities, UNDP and UNMAO 
should select only appropriate national staff for formal training and for 
other staff development opportunities. Selection criteria should be 
used to chose individuals for training, but this should be accompanied 
by semi-structured discussions between the senior NMAC and SSDC 
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managers responsible for nominating participants, and UNMAO and 
UNDP staff responsible for sponsoring the training development. 
Priority Two  Develop resource mobilisation and donor liaison skills within the 
national authorities  
 While NMAC and SSDC have made some progress in getting funds 
from the Government of Sudan, the national authorities are passive in 
their approach to resource mobilisation. To ensure sustainability of 
demining efforts in the country post-2011, the NMAC and SSDC 
should develop better relationships with the international community in 
general and with mine action donors specifically. This will require 
individuals involved in raising both internal and external funding to 
learn how to interact with stakeholders, market their respective 
organisations, present robust business cases for support and 
demonstrate accountability and effectiveness through regular 
reporting to donors.  Consideration should be given to seeking 
professional fundraising guidance from organisations such as the 
International Trust Fund for Human Security28 who have recently 
adopted a programme of international outreach. 
Priority Three Develop needs assessment, project management, and 
monitoring and evaluation skills within operationally-focussed 
departments 
In their capacity as MACCs, the NMAC and SSDC need to be able to 
identify the requirement and prepare the specification for mine action 
projects including demining tasks conducted by JIDU clearance 
teams. The NMAC has developed a basic capability to define and 
prioritise requirements, design and manage projects, and provide 
effective oversight through monitoring and evaluation, SSDC needs 
much more assistance.  The development of NMAC and SSDC staff 
skills in project management should be a combination of formal 
instruction followed by on-the-job coaching and supervision by 
qualified international staff.  
Priority Four Recognise individual commitment and support personal initiative 
 Quality and the commitment of staff varies between and within 
organisations. Individuals who demonstrate commitment and are 
clearly motivated should be encouraged to develop at an accelerated 
speed, and not at the pace of less motivated and less committed staff.  
When individuals identify their own training needs in a rational and 
well-considered manner, these should be supported by UNDP and 
UNMAO. For example, the SSDC finance officer has identified a night 
school training opportunity in Juba, that could help to enhance his 
accountancy and book-keeping skills, at a cost of US$600. By 
ensuring attendance on similar courses, external agencies would 
support both the trainee, but also the local institution. This process of 
identifying ongoing training opportunities should be formalised, and 
embedded within a structured performance appraisal process. The 
SSDC should continue to institute its own performance appraisal 
process, and preferably with observation and input from a UNDP 
technical adviser, with access to a funds for local training. The NMAC 
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should consider establishing a similar process, in addition to its 
standard civil service performance appraisal systems.  
Priority Five Broaden understanding of the regional context of mine action  
UNDP is encouraged to broaden the understanding of the staff of 
national authorities to the regional and global context of mine action. 
Interaction with staff from neighbouring countries and the wider world 
is important to ensure the adoption of best practice through 
comparison of alternative management systems, procedure and 
practices. 
 
Notes on Section 6: 
27. See, http://www.unops.org/english/whatweneed/Pages/Contractawards.aspx, accessed 20 September 
2008. 
28. Formerly the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance. 
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY 
SECTION 7: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
7.1 Overview 
The capacity development plan includes projects and activities which aim to improve the 
enabling environment, organisational capacities, and the competences of individual members 
of staff.  The plan is designed to address the priorities identified in Section 6 in a timely 
manner, and to ensure the development of sustainable national mine action programme.  
The plan consists of three phases, each of three years duration. The first phase covers the 
remaining period of the UN Mission; the second phase covers the period leading up to the 
deadline of the Mine Ban Treaty; the third phase covers the period following the removal of 
all known mined areas - when the emphasis will be on delivering mine action services which 
support broader national reconstruction and redevelopment goals. For practical reasons, this 
plan places more emphasis on the details of the first phase than on subsequent phases. 
  2009 - 2011 2012 - 2014 2015 - 2017 
     
Phase  Transition MBT deadline National development 
Lead  United Nations Government of Sudan Government of Sudan 
Mine action objectives  Clear all high and 
medium impacted 
communities  
Clear all remaining 
suspected hazardous 
areas 
Conduct MRE and VA, 
and address the 
residual threat as and 
when hazards are 
discovered 
Development objectives  Enable national 
authorities to be capable 
of regulating and 
managing mine action in 
all provinces of Sudan 
Enable national 
authorities to improve 
the effectiveness, 
efficiency and safety of 
mine action in all 
provinces of Sudan 
Enable national 
authorities to regulate 
and manage mine 




The Transition Phase runs from 2009-2011. It is designed to enhance the capacities of the 
national authorities and to ensure that they are able to regulate and manage mine action in 
all provinces of Sudan by the end of the mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan. Interventions 
under this phase will contribute to the mine action capacity development goals specified in 
both the UN Development Assistance Framework 2009-2012, and the UNDP Country 
Planning Document 2009-2011, namely: 
 UNDAF 2009-2012, 1.2.1  
"Strengthen national institutions' capacity to prioritise, coordinate and manage all 
aspects of mine action at central and state levels, including implementation of national 
and international obligations under the Ottawa Convention (UNMAO, UNDP, UNV)” 
 CPD 2009-2011, 7.1  
"National/sub-national capacities strengthened to manage the national mine action 
programme” 
It is important to note that during this phase capacity development is aligned with the 
transition process, but is not driven by it. That being said, activities must capture the 
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opportunities presented by a large UNMAO presence in the country up until 2011, to 
maximise the skill and knowledge transfer potential between the various organisations.  
The second phase takes place between 2012 and 2014, and represents the “Ottawa” MBT 
phase, in which emphasis is placed on meeting Sudan‟s obligations as a State Party to the 
Treaty. It will therefore be highly consistent with the UNDAF Goal 1.2.1. There may be new 
mine action requirements to be met and new governance issues to be addressed after the 
referendum of 2011, but for current planning purposes the “one-country-two-systems” 
approach is appropriate. This second phase is followed by a “National Development” phase 
where emphasis is placed on meeting a residual threat through a highly mainstreamed 
system. In this phase it is assumed that development priorities rather than humanitarian ones 
will be the norm.  
7.2 Transition Phase (2009 - 2011) 
7.2.1 Activities in the enabling environment 
Enhancing facilitating factors and removing constraints to performance are the primary 
activities in this phase. Without favourable institutional conditions and enabling environment, 
capacity development will be stifled. UNDP and UNMAO are strongly encouraged to 
undertake the following activities within this phase: 
a. Reinstitute the UN oversight mechanism.  
The national Interagency Coordination Group for Mine Action in Sudan should 
be established to provide oversight of mine action activities in the country and in 
particular the capacity development and transition processes. The oversight 
mechanism will act as a top-down driver for change, as well as provide 
accountability for achieving results. It can also help to provide the political space 
in which change and negotiation can take place.  
b. Regularise meetings of the national oversight mechanism.  
The National Mine Action Committee should be convened on a regular basis. It 
will maintain and improve interdependencies between northern and southern 
programmes as the Committee has representation from both northern and 
southern ministers. The oversight mechanism will ensure that implementation of 
the mine action policies and strategies are monitored in a regular and 
transparent way, and is designed to meet the needs of impacted constituencies 
in a balanced and just manner. 
c. Develop relevant national legislation that clearly defines the roles, 
responsibilities and powers of the national authorities.  
Specifically, this should include legislation, which allows the SSDC to exercise 
its authority in accordance with principles of good governance. Proper legislation 
will create the framework in which organisations can grow.  It will also ensure 
accountability and security for the national authorities and the organisations 
working in mine action in Sudan (either foreign or national). Lastly it will give the 
SSDC the legitimacy it requires in order to begin functioning effectively. 
d. Use the MYWP as a sectoral device for supporting national capacity 
development.  
The MYWP provides a suitable framework for supporting national mine action 
capacity development and offers the prospect of financial sustainability until the 
Ottawa MBT deadline. It will align the efforts of all stakeholders and thus 
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improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the sector in general, and the 
national authorities specifically. 
e. Continue to provide resource support to the national authorities.  
Support should be in a manner that is directly linked to clearly defined, strategic 
objectives and directives. By resource support, the international community is 
removing a clear constraint to implementation. 
During this phase, UNDP, UNMAO and the national authorities should work together to 
establish a workable system for ensuring knowledge retention and management within the 
national authorities. This could either be through the development of better knowledge 
management systems, internal (peer-to-peer) training, handover periods, and a career 
structure in which individuals are promoted within the organisations, rather than across 
different government departments One externally driven incentive system could be the 
establishment of a fund for local training, which can be used to train individuals according to 
their personally identified training needs, through agencies identified within the local market. 
By addressing these institutional concerns, the capacity development plan covers the primary 
enabling environment priorities identified during the course of this analysis and assessment. 
In order to be realistic and achievable, UNDP should spot opportunities for intervention at the 
enabling environment level as they arise, and practitioners should note that given the political 
and procedural nature of these activities, there is no specific order for implementation. 
7.2.2 Activities at the organisational level 
Traditionally, performance at this level can be enhanced through concerted organisational 
development. However, in this plan, intervention at the organisational level is proposed 
through specific capacity development “projects” that align different agencies with different 
mandates with a common vision and approach. This is based on the realisation that for both 
NMAC and SSDC, the lack of interdependency during the formative periods of national 
agency development has meant that traditional organisational development approaches may 
be seen as interfering, rather than assisting. This would be exacerbated if new public 
management approaches were employed that sought to limit or reduce the number of staff 
within each organisation; particularly in light of the costs and staffing levels currently existing 
in the UN programme. The utility of the project approach is also based on the opportunity to 
embed capacity development projects within the MYWP. The MYWP is a sectoral initiative, 
which demonstrates how the mine action programme as a whole will meet the Ottawa MBT 
deadline, and how clearance will be funded and achieved passed the end of the UN mission 
mandate in 2011.   
The approach offers considerable opportunities for mobilising resources for capacity 
development initiatives over a number of years, and will be tracked to the performance of the 
programme as a whole. The projects link directly to the Mine Action Strategic Framework and 
offer an opportunity for UNDP to harmonise its results-based planning approach – the 
Country Planning Document – with the objectives of the programme, and for the UNMAO to 
track progress towards transition. Each project is fully equipped with performance indicators 
that can be used to track capacity development and progress towards achieving full “national 
ownership”. Finally, because the project is managed by the UN, all agencies involved in its 
implementation are committed to achieving the project outcomes.  
Therefore, it is proposed that a number of projects are developed which cover the main areas 
of specific governance (1) quality and monitoring, and (2) information management and 
planning. These projects would be supported by a general governance project designed to 
raise performance in logistics, administration and finance, i.e. (3) a support systems project. 
The projects are based on the assumption that the NMAC and SSDC as organisations will 
remain completely responsible for managing their own affairs as organisations. In the 
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subsequent phases, once interdependencies have been constructed around the resource, 
accountability, and information flows generated through the project, more traditional 
organisational approaches and projects can be used. 
a. Quality and Monitoring Project 
Strategic goals:  National Strategic Framework Goal:  Strengthen the national 
mine action institutions to be able to plan and monitor all 
aspects of mine action. 
Supporting Outcome:  NMAC and SSDC plan effectively, 
efficiently and conduct quality assurance in accordance with 
NTSGs, across all pillars of mine action, and are supported 
by robust administration, logistics and finance departments. 
UNDAF 2009-2012, 1.2.1 Strengthen national institutions' 
capacity to prioritise, coordinate and manage all aspects of 
mine action at central and state levels, including 
implementation of national and international obligations 
under the Ottawa Convention (UNMAO, UNDP, UNV) 
CPD 2009-2011, 7.1  National / sub-national capacities 
strengthened to manage the national mine action 
programme. 
Target groups:  Quality assurance director and staff. Operations managers 
may be involved depending on circumstance and anticipated 
future role. Only individuals from the national authorities 
should be involved.  
The project targets the quality assurance function within the 
national authorities. It addresses the quality management 
priorities identified as a capacity development priority at the 
organisational level; since it is addressing quality 
management, it will develop specific governance capabilities 
within the national authorities. Quality assurance staff will 
become involved in the process of accrediting and assuring 
quality on the current set of organisations conducting 
clearance in Sudan. This will be a gradual process that 
begins with basic training, secondments and field visits. 
Responsibilities should be gradually transferred, for example 
initially performing organisational accreditation in an assisted 
manner, then unassisted but monitored, until finally in an 
unassisted and unmonitored fashion. The project will be 
coordinated by UNDP, but the critical partner agency will be 
UNMAO where technical expertise currently resides. Other 
agencies such as NGOs operating in the country, and which 
have good relations with the national agencies can be used to 
assist quality managers in gaining technical skills. 
Year One activities:  Translation of the National Technical Standards and 
Guidelines from English into Arabic; formal training on quality 
and quality management; organisational participation in the 
accreditation process; technical advice and work placements; 
field visits alongside UNMAO quality management team as 
advisors;  purchase of necessary equipment (including 
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vehicles);  workshops to define quality management policy 
and practice within the programme 
Year Two activities:  Refresher training on quality approaches; UNMAO provide 
assistance in nationally-led accreditation; field visits with 
UNMAO quality management team as observers; two 
workshops on Quality Assurance policy; continued support for 
equipment running costs and maintenance; a training of 
trainers course so that quality managers can transfer skills 
effectively. 
Year Three activities:  Field visits with UNMAO as observers; nationally-led 
accreditation with UNMAO as monitors; workshop on quality 
policy and practice; supply equipment running costs and 
maintenance; a training of trainers course so that quality 
managers can transfer skills effectively. 
Performance indicators to be used in this project are shown at Annex G. 
b. Information Management Project 
Strategic goals: Same as the Quality and Monitoring Project  
Target groups:  IMSMA officers from the national authorities‟ headquarters 
and regional sub-offices. Planning and staff from operations 
and other functional departments with a responsibility for 
planning and strategy development. Only individuals from the 
national authorities should be involved in the training.   
The project targets the IMSMA and planning functionalities 
within the national authorities. It addresses the information 
management and planning– specific governance concerns – 
identified during the course of this assessment. In this project, 
IMSMA and planning staff are involved in the process of 
overseeing the collection of data, manipulating data in a 
spatial manner and extracting products on impact, threat and 
mine action activities in accordance with internationally 
accepted practice, both for planning purposes and in support 
of implementing agencies and other government departments 
This will be a gradual process that begins with basic training, 
secondments and field visits. Responsibilities should be 
gradually transferred, for example formal training to ensure a 
base-level competency, then coaching and assistance until in 
year three, the national authorities are monitored on their 
performance. The project will be coordinated by UNDP, but 
the critical partner agency will be UNMAO where technical 
expertise currently resides. Other agencies such as the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining can 
be used to assist IMSMA operators in gaining technical skills. 
Year One activities:  Formal training courses on the basics of IMSMA to ensure 
that training target groups are familiar with the fundamental 
elements of, and purpose of, IMSMA; assisted data-
entry/manipulation with UNMAO IMSMA department and 
technical officers; technical advice on the use of the IMSMA 
database for accessing and retrieving data and making 
simple IMSMA products for the operations and planning 
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departments; assisted work-plan development using data 
extracted from IMSMA with direct assistance of UNMAO 
programme management section and planning officers; 
equipment procurement and installation (IT, navigation, 
vehicles); field visits 
Year Two activities:  Formal training courses on intermediate level IMSMA topics; 
managing data entry, producing maps and graphical products 
at the request of implementing partners and planning and 
operations departments, with monitoring from UNMAO 
IMSMA operators; ensuring that the quality of the information 
in the database is maintained, under the supervision of the 
UNMAO; operations and planning departments creating work-
plans and long-term strategies based on empirically defined 
need, under monitoring from UNMAO. 
Year Three activities:  Refresher training on IMSMA and any IMSMA updates; 
externally-led courses on specific topics, e.g. on spatial 
analysis; custodianship of the IMSMA database in partnership 
and under monitoring of UNMAO IMSMA operators; strategy 
and work-plan development, with assistance and monitoring 
from UNMAO as-required. 
Performance indicators to be used in this project are shown at Annex H. 
c. Support Systems Project  
Strategic goals: Same as the Quality and Monitoring Project  
Target groups:  Administration managers and personnel (including human 
resource managers), logistics managers, fleet manager, 
storekeepers, finance directors and officers. Only individuals 
from the national authorities should be involved in the 
training. 
 This project targets the administration, logistics and finance 
functions within the national authorities. It specifically 
addresses the administration, finance and logistics priorities 
for capacity development, identified at the organisational 
level. On completion of the project, personnel within these 
support departments will be able to support the core business 
processes of the national authorities through efficient, 
effective and transparent administration, logistics and finance. 
The project recognises that national authorities are 
embedded within existing or emerging governance 
environments, and processes and formalities arising from the 
projects will be consistent with overarching government 
regulations, for example on financial accounting. The process 
of capacity development will be incremental and skills and 
knowledge will be gradually transferred, for example formal 
training to ensure a base-level competency, then coaching 
and assistance, until in year three the national authorities are 
monitored on their performance. The project will be 
coordinated by UNDP. Other agencies and organisations 
which specialise in administration, logistics and finance and 
associated management support systems, and which have 
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good relations with the national agencies can be used to 
assist administration and finance personnel in gaining 
technical skills. 
Year One activities:  On the job training within administration, logistics and finance 
departments; business management software installed; IT 
procurement; office supply and partial operational expenses 
Year Two activities:  Implementation of coaching system; advanced training 
courses (including personnel from Operations, MRE, VA); 
training consultancies for specialist knowledge and skill 
requirements; IT equipment procured; office supply and 
partial operational costs 
Year Three activities:  Monitoring of previous coachees; short term training 
consultancies targeting logistics, administration and finance 
requirements in the MRE, VA, Operations departments; IT 
and communications equipment purchased; office supply and 
partial operational expenses 
Performance indicators to be used in this project are shown at Annex I. 
7.2.3 Activities at the human resource level 
Activities at the human resource level should capitalise on the availability of large numbers of 
international personnel working in the programme. However, to-date there has been a 
passive, “open-door” approach towards technical advice and direct mentoring or coaching of 
staff from the national authorities. If skills and knowledge transfer is to occur at the levels 
required, external agencies must make a cultural shift towards proactive technical advice, 
mentoring and coaching of the national authorities. This may be assisted through specific 
training on technical advice, skills and knowledge transfer techniques, which is targeted at 
UNMAO staff which may work directly with national authority counterparts. Since the specific 
governance areas of quality and information management are covered under the project 
approach, technical advice will be in a reduced number of areas, and will generally relate to 
core competencies.  
a. Develop resource mobilisation and donor liaison skills within the national 
authorities  
A mentoring system between UNMAO programme officers and UNDP technical 
advisors should be established so that financial forecasting, marketing and 
donor reporting skills are enhanced. This should also include opening direct 
channels of communication between appropriate donors and the national 
authorities themselves. However, expectations should be managed; it is unlikely 
that any significant budgetary support will be allocated to the national authorities 
unless they are well developed and demonstrating significant accountability and 
transparency. National authorities should therefore place emphasis on helping 
to raise funds for the programme as whole, and identifying and securing funding 
sources for indigenous civil society and commercial sector organisations. This 
will in-turn build the legitimacy of the national authorities amongst national 
stakeholders and civil society organisations, for example. 
b. Develop needs assessment, project management, and monitoring and 
evaluation skills within operationally-focussed departments 
Specific training courses may be used for this development intervention.  
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(1) Needs assessment training 
Target group: senior and mid-level managers in the Operations, MRE, VA 
departments within the national authorities.  
Specific learning objectives of the training: 
By the end of the training, the national authority managers should be able to… 
  Explain the advantages and disadvantages of a range of research 
methods 
  Demonstrate how needs assessment can be embedded in the project 
cycle 
  Demonstrate an understanding of the need to establish baseline data  
  Explain the most appropriate methodologies for a given rapid needs 
assessment in the mine action sector 
  Demonstrate an understanding of how needs can be converted into 
objectives for action  
(2) Project management training 
Target group: senior and mid-level managers in the Operations, MRE, VA 
departments within the national authorities.  
Specific learning objectives of the training: 
By the end of the training, the national authority managers should be able to… 
  Explain the benefits and limitations of using a project life-cycle approach 
  Create a work breakdown structure for typical projects in the Sudan mine 
action programme 
  Describe the project planning process and develop project plans 
  Select an appropriate risk management strategy. 
  Create a project budget and cash flow appropriate for activities undertaken 
by the national authorities 
  Understand need for effective communications and negotiation, with a 
particular emphasis on working with external stakeholders 
  Articulate the main concepts of leadership, teamwork, and their value to 
project management  
This training should be synchronised with the organisational performance 
projects, so that staff gain a symbiotic understanding between needs 
assessments and IMSMA, and likewise between project implementation and 
quality assurance. 
(3) Monitoring and evaluation training 
Target group: senior and mid-level managers in the Operations, MRE, VA, 
departments within the national authorities.  
Specific learning objectives of the training: 
By the end of the training, the national authority managers should be able to… 
  Demonstrate an understanding of the differences between monitoring and 
evaluation  and describe their usage 
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  Explain the benefits of participation in evaluation and the linkage between 
participation, capacity development and accountability 
  Develop indicators that can reflect performance in terms of quality and 
impact 
  Suggest practical ways of monitoring and evaluating projects that may 
arise in Sudan (e.g. emergency projects) 
  Demonstrate the linkage between accountability, performance 
management and quality management  
  Analyse how policy develops and shapes constituencies, and suggest how 
tensions and conflict may arise from macro-level policy, using examples 
from VA and MRE in Sudan 
 
c. Develop a system of work exchanges and placements for employees of 
the national authorities 
This could include facilitating work exchanges for employees that demonstrate 
particular aptitude and commitment to their current roles. Foreign visits and 
exchanges may thus be used effectively as part of an incentive system linked to 
performance, but it is important that incentives are duly attached to other 
capacity development activities and priorities as outlined above. Activities in this 
phase can be used to prepare for capacity development interventions in the 
Ottawa Deadline Phase by selecting visits that highlight the potential of specific 
forms of intervention, e.g. ISO quality management. 
7.3 Ottawa Deadline Phase  (2011 - 2014) 
The Quality Management and IMSMA projects in the Transition Phase address the specific 
governance issues of: accreditation, quality assurance and control, information management, 
and planning. The Support Systems project addresses a number of key, general governance 
issues such the need for probity and accountability within the programme. Through learning 
the core processes that define a national mine action authority, personnel within the 
authorities will become familiar with mine action in both principle and practice, and thus gain 
knowledge of the sector, in a sustained and experiential manner. However, there is space for 
further improvement of all organisations. Organisational development may come in a number 
of formats – all have the aim of improving organisational efficiency and effectiveness. This 
may require changing the structures of organisations, and the manner in which they conduct 
their businesses. However, in the state sector, reform is a difficult process and before 
transition it is unlikely that the UNMAO has enough leverage to institute reforms within the 
national authorities. That being said commitment to change need not be externally driven, it 
can be lead internally through the usage of quality management systems that are designed to 
lay bare the business processes of an organisation, and justify how they contribute to 
stakeholder satisfaction. 
It is thus recommended that during the Ottawa Phase, that once the national authorities are 
familiar with their roles and responsibilities, a quality management system is introduced within 
them. There are a range of commercially available quality management systems that can be 
used, but they all have certain elements in common. Firstly, they require a detailed analysis 
and understanding of how the organisations deliver products and services, and secondly that 
the organisations develop a commitment to continually improving the manner in which those 
products and services are delivered and perceived to be delivered. A national authority that 
openly demonstrates a commitment to quality through practical application, will be more 
resource efficient, transparent, accountable and focused on achieving outcomes. The 
organisations are donor friendly and attract sustainable funding. 
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7.4 National Development Phase  (2015 - 2017) 
In response to diminishing need, and reduced levels of resources the programme will have 
changed in scale and scope by 2014. It is likely that a raft of new capacity development 
priorities will have been identified; and Sudan may or may not have asked for an extension 
for its Ottawa Treaty obligations. Experience in other countries and programmes indicate that 
at a mature phase, mine action programmes are highly mainstreamed. Tasking and 
prioritisation where it occurs, is aligned with the needs of specific development priorities and 
private sector work; the NMAC already recognises its future role along these lines. It is likely 
that efficiency, effectiveness and value for money are the watchwords of this Phase. It is 
strongly encouraged that UNDP conduct a further, detailed capacity assessment in mid or 
late 2011 – in addition to its regular reviews – in order to ascertain the priorities and 
subsequent way ahead for the National Development Phase. 
7.5 Monitoring and evaluation approach 
The mine action programme in the Sudan has been characterised by a lack of 
interdependency between national and international agencies, and this leads to partisan 
positioning around some key issues. In order to avoid bias in the monitoring and evaluation 
approach, participation of all primary stakeholders is critical. Firstly, this will ensure 
accountability over the results of the evaluation – negotiations and accommodations must be 
sought, rather than the executive delivery of judgments. Secondly, participation will promote 
learning and capacity development as successes and failures are shared throughout the 
programme. In addition to an ethos of participation, the monitoring and evaluation 
methodology should incorporate a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative data. Both 
types of data are mutually reinforcing – quantitative data provides strong evidence for 
processes and outputs, i.e. efficiency and effectiveness, while qualitative data provide an 
understanding of the quality of deliverables and outcomes, i.e. efficacy and effectiveness, as 
well as information on the manner in which activities are conducted, e.g. probity. To ensure 
that the capacity development plan remains appropriate and fit for purpose, it is assumed that 
a formative approach to monitoring and evaluation be adopted, i.e. evaluation is ongoing and 
the interventions are adjusted to ensure that they consistently meet the requirement. 
Evidence for performance at the enabling environment level can be reviewed through 
discussion between UNDP, UNMAO and national authorities and other key stakeholders. At 
these occasions, success in removing constraints may be informally evaluated, while new 
and emerging constraints and opportunities may be identified; intervention at the enabling 
environment level may be considered an ongoing exercise. The capacity development 
projects, which are designed to address capacity development priorities at the organisational 
level, are equipped with their own indicators. For monitoring and evaluating performance at 
the human resource level, it is strongly suggested that tailor-made approaches are developed 
for each specific intervention. For example, training interventions may be accompanied by 
instructor reports on trainee performance and development, formal testing, and line manager 
reviews on an enhancement in the skills and knowledge of trainees after they have returned 
to work. Work exchanges may be evaluated through interviews with the exchange student, 
and the host organisation as to the perceived benefits derived through the process. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Capacity development A broad concept which enables individuals, groups, 
organisations, institutions and societies to increase their ability 
to manage and deliver capabilities – and to take ownership of 
the problem and its solution.  In mine action in involves the 
introduction of appropriate national laws and standards, the 
development of systems of governance and coordination, the 
ability of national authorities to mobilise resources from national 
budgets, and the development of national managers through 
education, training and coaching. 
Civil society Civil society is composed of the totality of voluntary, civic and 
social organisations and institutions that form the basis of a 
functioning society as opposed to the formal structures of the 
state. In theory, the mechanisms of civil society should be 
distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in 
practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and 
market are often complex, blurred and negotiated.   
[Adam Ferguson 1723-1816, philosopher and historian of the 
Scottish Enlightenment.] 
In this paper the term is used to describe groups – often NGOs 
- such as the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines (SCBL), the 
Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRCS) and the Sudanese 
Association for Combating Landmines (JASMAR) 
End state The term originates from the military.  US Field Manual (FM) 
100-5 defines the term as “.... a set of conditions which 
determines that the strategic objectives have been met.”   
 In this paper the term is used to describe a set of conditions 
which determines that a mine action programme has achieved 
a state in which: 
a) stable and sustainable national ownership has occurred; 
b) the impact from the remaining landmines and UXO is 
deemed to be manageable; 
c) substantial external assistance is no longer needed. 
Governance The action or manner of conducting the policy and affairs of a 
state, organisation or people [Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition] 
 In this paper, the term is used to describe the actions or 
manner of the national government of conducting the policy and 
affairs of the state.  
Governance (UNDP definition) 
Governance is the system of values, policies and institutions by 
which a society manages its economic, political and social 
affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil 
society and private sector. It is the way a society organises 
itself to make and implement decisions - achieving mutual 
understanding, agreement and action. It comprises the 
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mechanisms and processes for citizens and groups to articulate 
their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal 
rights and obligations. It is the rules, institutions and practices 
that set limits and provide incentives for individuals, 
organisations and firms. Governance, including its social, 
political and economic dimensions, operates at every level of 
human enterprise, be it the household, village, municipality, 
nation, region or globe. 
IMAS International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) are documents 
developed by the UN on behalf of the international community, 
which aim to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by 
providing guidance, by establishing principles and, in some 
cases, by defining international requirements and 
specifications. 
IMAS 04.10 notes that: 
They provide a frame of reference which encourages, and in 
some cases requires, the sponsors and managers of mine 
action programmes and projects to achieve and demonstrate 
agreed levels of effectiveness and safety. 
They provide a common language, and recommend the formats 
and rules for handling data which enable the free exchange of 
important information; this information exchange benefits other 
programmes and projects, and assists the mobilisation, 
prioritisation and management of resources. 
IMSMA International Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
MAC, MACC Mine action centre (or mine action coordination centre) is an 
organisation that carries out mine risk education training, 
conducts reconnaissance of mined areas, collection and 
centralisation of mine data and coordinates local (mine action) 
plans with the activities of external agencies, of (mine action) 
NGOs and of local deminers.  
[UN Terminology Bulletin No. 349] 
Mine action Activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and 
environmental impact of mines and explosive remnants of war 
(ERW).   
IMAS 04.10 notes that:  
Mine action is not just about demining; it is also about people 
and societies, and how they are affected by landmine and ERW 
contamination. The objective of mine action is to reduce the risk 
from landmines and ERW to a level where people can live 
safely; in which economic, social and health development can 
occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine and ERW 
contamination, and in which the victims’ needs can be 
addressed. Mine action comprises five complementary groups 
of activities: 
a)  mine risk education (MRE); 
b)  humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and ERW survey, 
mapping, marking and clearance;  
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c)  victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration; 
d)  stockpile destruction; and 
e)  advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines. 
NMAA National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) is the government 
department(s), organisation(s) or institution(s) in each mine-
affected country charged with the regulation, management and 
coordination of mine action 
IMAS 04.10 notes that: 
In most cases the national MAC or its equivalent will act as, or 
on behalf of, the NMAA; and that in certain situations and at 
certain times it may be necessary and appropriate for the UN, 
or some other recognised international body, to assume some 
or all of the responsibilities, and fulfil some or all the functions, 
of a NMAA. 
National ownership In a strict legal sense, the term can be used to describe the 
ownership of property by the state, but it is used by 
international organisations, NGOs and civil society in a wider 
sense as exercising the right and accepting the responsibility to 
address issues or challenges of national concern such as 
poverty, disease, human rights and global warming. 
Objective Specific targets set by the organisation to achieve its vision.  An 
objective should be precise and quantifiable, and should be 
achievable with the resources which are likely to become 
available. 
Ownership In a legal sense, the term is used to describe the exclusive 
rights and control over property, which may be an object, land, 
real estate, or intellectual property. It is embodied in a right of 
ownership, which is often referred to as title.  Ownership also 
implies some degree of interest in maintaining, or indeed further 
developing, the worth of the property. 
Sudanmap The Sudan Mine Action Programme 
Transition The process of changing from one state or condition to another 
[Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition] 
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TRANSITION, NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND CAPACITY 
Transition 
Despite a dual mandate of service delivery and capacity development, few interdependencies 
have been developed between the UN-led mine action effort and the national authorities in 
terms of work-sharing, skills transfer or the exchange of information, funds or physical 
resources29. The effect that this lack of interdependency has had on the programme are 
further-reaching that perhaps originally anticipated; it has led to the development of three 
essentially parallel coordination structures and capacities – NMAC, SSDC, UNMAO – which 
although sometimes co-located, share little apart from a general vision for a Sudan free of the 
threat of landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). The effects of this institutional 
disengagement30 led a GICHD evaluation team to warn that national agencies operating 
outside of the main thrust of internationally-led mine action activity could lead to: the loss of a 
single definitive source of information on the landmine threat; greater difficulty in enforcing 
international standards; the potential requirement to re-clear land; and finally the ability to 
recognise government capacity31.  
Lack of interdependency and differing views on what constitutes acceptable service delivery 
have resulted in different standpoints between national authorities and international agencies 
on how legitimacy and accountability are constituted within the programme. This issue is 
particularly prescient because if the UN-mission is disbanded prior to the attainment of 
humanitarian targets, certain roles and responsibilities currently invested in the UN will need 
to transition to the government32. In addition to the capacity to coordinate mine action 
activities in accordance with normative international standards transition is strongly linked to 
issues of governance, accountability and legitimacy, which themselves will have profound 
impacts on the development of an effective, practical and sustainable transition plan. Yet 
without interdependencies, the danger exists that the UN and specifically the principle 
UNMAS component may lack sufficient leverage to bring about organisational reforms to 
ongoing national working practices; reforms that the UN feels that are required for a 
successful transition process. Unless managed carefully, future activities are likely to be 
defined by sanctions rather than incentives, or that the parallel structures will simply continue 
to grow in dimension and mandate and thus broadening the potential for conflict 
National ownership and capacity  
The dominant narrative of transition in Sudan is centred on the concept of ownership. As with 
all socially constructed concepts, both terms transition and ownership are contested. This is 
certainly the case in Sudan, where multiple agencies, including national executive bodies, 
with different values, cultures, missions and mandates seek to fulfil their objectives and in so-
doing develop and propagate different worldviews. Many external stakeholders view 
transition as the appropriation of specific technical functions by national authorities, as their 
own programmatic strength is reduced. Whereas national stakeholders including ministries 
and national authorities view transition through a political lens in which certain, sovereign 
rights and responsibilities have always remained with the national authorities. It is likely that a 
compromise position – if such a position exists – occupies a domain somewhere in-between 
these generalised technical and political extremes.  
Although the details may be challenged, the basic premise that transition involves the 
transfer of power and responsibility in some format is a reasonable assumption. This may be 
considered the realm of governance which is concerned with deciding how services are to be 
provided, who will provide them, and deciding to which constituencies and for which 
purposes they will be provided. The term ownership alone is insufficient to capture the 
characteristics of accountability and legitimacy which is the essence of governance, as it is 
provided by the UNMAO. For instance, UNMAO cannot necessarily claim “ownership” on the 
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behalf of the Sudanese people, thus there is nothing “owned” which can be transferred. The 
term trusteeship, which implies a sense of both assumed and sovereign legitimacy in the 
delivery of certain services designed to bring about social outcomes can be used to bridge 
this ideological gap33. 
From this frame of reference, the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GONU) and the 
Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) claim ownership over their relevant constituencies in 
the North and the South. This is a form of trusteeship based on political legitimacy – 
theoretically defined through electoral and policy development processes, taxation systems 
and the redistribution of wealth through social services34. Trusteeship in this sense may mean 
taking decisions that are developmental rather than humanitarian in nature. The UNMAO 
however, has trusteeship vested within it by the international community for the technical 
delivery of certain services in support of peacekeeping and general humanitarian purposes. 
External agencies such as UNMAO must also prove their legitimacy with respect to their 
managers and donors, as well as their beneficiaries and national partners. UNMAO do this 
through the efficient and effective delivery of their essential humanitarian and peacekeeping 
services35. However, the national authorities may not necessarily feel the need to 
demonstrate legitimacy to external stakeholders in the absence of clear incentives and/or 
sanctions.  
This brief analysis highlights significant differences in accountability flows between internal 
and external agencies – they are at the heart of the conflict between development and 
humanitarianism. The tangible result is that external humanitarian agencies such as UNMAO 
seek assurances of technical efficiency and effectiveness of the National Authorities; they 
equate ownership and thus transition with the development of technical capacity from which 
responsibility will follow. On the other hand, the government supports the intentions of 
capacity development, but naturally defines ownership with the formal legitimacy accorded to 
it by the Sudanese people rather than through the international community – uniting concepts 
of citizenship, sovereignty and national sentiment. Thus while they recognise the need for 
skills and knowledge transfer, they view transition in terms of an existing responsibility from 
which capacity can subsequently be derived. The result is a fundamental confusion between 
the means of achieving what are essentially the same ends. The implications for both 
capacity development and transition are profound. 
Capacity and transition 
As shown above, there are certain elements of ownership of the programme that can never 
be claimed by external stakeholders such as a single UN agency, while the nation-state is 
functional, and thus ownership cannot be viewed in terms of technical capacity alone. So 
although they are related, capacity and transition are not interchangeable terms. What is 
more useful to consider is a process of transition of specific governance functions which are 
under the trusteeship of the UN, to national ownership. In this sense, ownership may be 
considered the capacity to exercise governance of a mine action programme, i.e. determining 
what mine action services are to be delivered, the manner in which services are delivered 
and who benefits from the service. 
Governance can be divided into two components: (a) specific governance characteristics, 
and (b) general governance characteristics. Specific governance characteristics include the 
processes by which demining organisations are accredited, funded and tasked. It also 
includes the capacity to set priorities and make plans that reflect both humanitarian as well as 
national priorities; the capacity to generate funding through a range of mechanisms (national 
and international) for mine action tasks; and the capacity to control and ensure the integrity of 
information on hazard and impact data.  
General governance capacity on the other hand, means providing an environment that 
enables the specific governance processes as well as technical management. This includes 
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the ability to recruit and select employees based on merit; the ability to ensure that technical 
decision making is not heavily influenced by politics; the ability to ensure that decisions are 
made in a transparent manner; the ability to ensure that accountability is maintained within 
individuals within organisations; and mechanisms to ensure a high level of public access to 
decision-makers to ensure that policy reflects the needs of citizens. At a more technical level, 
it requires the development of robust management procedures that will allow the efficient and 
effective management of processes.  
While specific governance tasks will be strongly influenced by the environment in which they 
are carried out, the UN is not in a position to transfer these general governance capacities. 
They are subject to wider development implications and as such must be built over the long 
term. Instead, the UN has assumed trusteeship of the specific governance characteristics 
alone36, and these should form the principal basis of discussion on transition. The current 
trustees for these functions should be explicit in expressing their conditions for the transfer of 
trusteeship, in terms of general governance and functional capacity.  
The governance processes are supported by a range of functional capacities. Even though 
there is no defined implementation requirement for the national authorities this does not 
mean that functional capacity should be subordinated with respect to governance. The 
specific outputs of mine action are defined by the five pillars of action, therefore the ability to 
be able to accredit, plan, task, monitor and evaluate impact of activities within the five pillars 
will be strongly linked to a technical knowledge of these activities. Thus the functional 
capacities and governance processes should be seen as mutually reinforcing. Capacity 
within the functional areas will include competency in monitoring and coordinating each of the 
five mine action activities throughout the project cycle. The cycle should begin at the process 
of identifying programme priorities and raising suitable amounts of funds. It should also 
include the ability to work with a wide range of stakeholders to build plans of action before 
planning, allocating resources, implementing, monitoring and evaluating. 
 
 
Notes on Annex B: 
29.  Some of these dependencies (such as direct budgetary support from the mission) are not possible, owing to 
international defined statutes. For a review of UN-programme responsibilities for capacity development and 
transition see UN Inter-Agency Policy (2005) para 62-64; 75; 85 
30.  Disengagement is typified by the so-called Wau-Babanosa railroad incident of 2007. For this joint funded 
World Bank and Government of National Unity project, the national authorities decided to conduct clearance 
without the assistance of the UNMAO, deeming that they could do more, in less time for less money using 
military Joint Integrated Demining Units. When the national authorities requested QA support for clearance 
certificates, the UNMAO declined on the basis that it cannot conduct quality assurance on unaccredited 
organisations such as the JIDU. The national view is that the UN may accredit on behalf of the government 
and not accredit the government itself, and subsequently an impasse has developed on the issue, resulting 
in two exclusive coordination mechanisms – national and UN. The clearance has been completed but is 
unrecognised by the UN. For a detailed account of the incident see Paterson and Bohle, Evaluation of the 
UNDP Sudan Mine Action Capacity Building and Development Project, February 2008, pp.19-23 
31.  Ibid. p.21 
32. This is in addition to the international imperative to transition, see UN Inter-Agency Policy (2005), para 
63-64. 
33. These differences are not purely semantic; they have caused genuine disagreement over the process of 
transition. 
34. These are forms of governmental capacity that are specifically supported by the UNDP. 
35. Factors that demonstrate legitimacy to national partners include: adhering to the apolitical UN mandate, 
demonstrating respect of cultural norms and values, and perhaps most importantly showing a commitment to 
the implementation of the CPA. 
36. Embedded within a general governance environment of its own – the UN governance environment.  
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UNDP CAPACITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
Many capacity assessment tools and approaches are available to development practitioners. 
Some are linear and hierarchal while others apply „softer‟ assessment methods, but all share 
the same three stage approach which is (1) to understand future requirements, (2) to analyse 
the suitability of current capabilities, and (3) by comparing current capabilities with future 
requirements, to assess the gap in capacity which needs to be closed through a programme 
of development projects.  
The UNDP Capacity Development Assessment Methodology has been adopted for this 
project.  It provides a systematic and defensible method of assessing capacity needs, 
establishing priorities and sequencing of capacity development projects and activities. The 
approach can be used in complex development situations when it is not always obvious 
where best to understand the relative needs and/or the order of implementing capacity 
development projects and activities. Not least, it provides a common language to facilitate 
discussion about the scale and scope of the capacity assessment.  The method thus 
represents an appropriate method of determining the capacity development requirements of 
the Sudan Mine Action Programme. 
This Annex describes the basic principles of the UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology 
as outlined in the User‟s Guide37.  The adaptation of these principles to the study is explained 
in Annex D. 
General principles  
The methodology is based on a conceptual framework which provides structure to a number 
of issues which need to be considered during the assessment exercise. The framework may 
be used to develop questions and provide lines of enquiry that are designed to elicit 
information on the capacity of an organisation, individuals within the organisation, or a whole 
social system. The capacity development framework proposed by UNDP is referred to as the 
„default framework‟, and practitioners are encouraged to adapt it to reflect local conditions 
and requirements. The default framework represents a complete system of capacity issues 
which need to be considered during any assessment; and are described as (1) the points of 
entry to the assessment, (2) the core issues, and (3) cross-cutting, functional and technical 
capacities.  
This can be shown graphically as a three-dimensional block; see Figure C.1. This block is 
divided into cells, with each cell corresponding to a coordinate comprised of three variables. 
These cells can be used to structure an inquiry into capacity development within a social 
system being analysed.  By addressing cells in sequence or order, or across different people, 
organisations or systems, one can compare and contrast capacity or performance and thus 
promote better understanding of the current and required competences of individuals and the 
capabilities of organisations. 
Points of entry to the assessment 
The „points of entry‟ define the scale of investigation of capacity of a social system. The 
„individual‟, „organisational‟, or „enabling environment‟ levels mean beginning a structured 
investigation of capacity at these levels respectively. It should be explicitly recognised that 
capacity at any of the levels will be influenced and impacted by issues occurring at the other 
two levels. This is because the enabling environment facilitates or constraints the actions of 
organisations, and organisations facilitate or constrain the actions of individuals. Likewise, 
the capacity of individuals will affect the performance of the organisation, and the summation 
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of organisational performance within a given social system will define the overall vector of 
performance of that system – the enabling environment.  
Core issues 
The Core issues are those issues that UNDP is most commonly called upon to address. 
These issues represent a mixture of tangible qualities such as levels of resources or 
financing, and intangible qualities such as quality of leadership. The developers of the 
framework see that not all of the issues covered by the default framework will necessarily be 
totally relevant for the purposes of particular assessment.  
Cross-cutting capacities 
The cross-cutting functional capacities are those capacities (individual competences, 
organisational procedures and practices, and soft issues such as leadership, morale and 
common purpose) that are critical for „.... the successful creation and management of 
policies, legislations, strategies and programmes‟ (UNDP, 2007, p.5). They correspond to 
specific activities within programme and project management cycles, i.e. beginning with 
problem identification, generating support for achieving a goal, managing a process, and 
finally culminating in monitoring and evaluation of activities. The cross-cutting issues are 
supported by a series of technical capacities which relate specifically to the type of capacity 
being analysed. These technical capacities include knowledge of the systems and processes 
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Figure A1:  UNDP Capacity Assessment ‘Default’ Framework 
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Comparing current capacities to future needs 
Most capacity assessment methodologies have a similar approach and the default UNDP 
methodology is no exception. The type of capacity and required level of performance is 
analysed, and then the current level of capacity with respect to an agreed end state is then 
assessed. It can therefore be seen whether the level of capacity meets the requirement, falls 
short of the requirement or even exceeds the requirement. In a rigorously applied, default 
UNDP system, this process would be conducted cell-by-cell, and considerable detail on the 
levels of capacity may be elucidated for comparison. However, owing to the flexible nature of 
this capacity assessment method, cells within the framework may be analysed in a non-
sequential manner and this will allow the more critical elements to be considered first, if time 
and resource constraints pose restrictions on depth of analysis.  
At the end of the process, the results are summarised and analysed. This will allow an 
understanding of where capacity gaps and excesses exist. In this way, interventions may be 
designed to enhance capacity in areas where it is lacking, and perhaps divert or redistribute 
assets away from areas where capacity levels exceed the requirement. 
Benefits of UNDP methodology 
The User Guide states that the UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology: 
 Provides a comprehensive view of the issues that could be addressed in a capacity 
assessment; 
 Brings rigour and a systematic method to determining future capacity needs and 
assessing existing capacity assets; 
 Creates a common language to facilitate discussion among potentially disparate parties; 
 Provides a structure for discussion about the scale and scope of the capacity 
assessment exercise and about expectations of the capacity development effort more 
generally; 
 Provides a method for generating quantitative as well as qualitative data to support the 
development of a capacity development action plan; 
 Makes sense of complex development situations, when it is not always obvious where 
best to intervene to promote capacity development; 
 Improves the consistency, coherence and impact of the work of UNDP; and 
 Increases the ability to share experiences. 
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37. See: Capacity Assessment Methodology, User‟s Guide, Capacity Development Group, Bureau for 
Development Policy, UNDP, May 2007 
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MODIFIED CAPACITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 
Adaptation of default framework 
As a first step in the analysis and assessment process, the default capacity assessment 
framework (as described in Annex C) was adapted to suit the objectives of this project, i.e. to 
establish the capacities of the national authorities for managing and regulating mine action in 
order to develop a capacity development plan that will improve their performance. The UNDP 
default framework was therefore adapted so that it was (1) relevant, by ensuring that it is 
compatible with the requirements of mine action as a standalone discipline, (2) mindful of the 
specific requirements of transition, and (3) inclusive of the core competency areas which 
constitute the ability of national authorities to coordinate and supervise mine action 
In order to do this, the core Issues were adapted to reflect the core issues of mine action, in 
this case the specific governance issues that dominate the discussions on transition and 
capacity development in Sudan. These core issues are Accreditation and Quality; Information 
Management; Planning, Tasking and Resource Mobilisation. In addition to the default 
Functional Capacities – which are essentially skills competencies – a cross-cutting Technical 
Capacity (a knowledge competency) was added to the framework. This knowledge 
competency refers to the specific knowledge of systems and processes that are particular to 
the mine action sector. For example, knowledge of the National Technical Standards and 
Guidelines, which would allow a quality assurance officer to conduct his work, this knowledge 
is in addition to the project management skills that an officer would require to discharge their 
duties effectively and efficiently. These technical capacities were cross-cutting and were 
considered where appropriate, as the national authorities would not be undertaking all of the 
activities implied by these issues. In order to ensure that against each of these issues, the 
capacity to design, gain support for, implement and assess results were covered, the 
Functional Capacities were slightly adjusted to ensure that each was relevant and 
appropriate for the purposes of the study. The Points of Entry categories remained the same. 
For the purposes of this particular assessment it was determined that the assessment 
approach would remain more qualitative rather than quantitative in nature, this was because 
it would (1) allow the assessment team to explore areas of future performance of the national 
authorities which had not been established up until this point, (2) reveal linkages between 
performance and facilitating and constraining factors, (3) reflect the problems of working with 
agencies that are still formative and frequently changing in scope and mandate, and (4) 
represent a more realistic and achievable assessment approach given the operational 
constraints, as it contains a greater degree of flexibility.  
Owing to the flexible nature of this capacity assessment method, cells within the framework 
were then analysed in a non-sequential manner and this allowed the more critical elements to 
be considered first. This meant assessing which cells would provide the most appropriate 
entry points, and initially placing emphasis at that dimension; focussing specifically on the 
performance-related requirements of the national authorities. In practice, the NMAC chose to 
enter discussions related to capacity based on Organisational performance, whereas the 
SSDC chose to begin discussions at the Human Resource level. From the entry point, 
specific linkages to the other levels (enabling environment, organisation, and human 
resource) were explored depending on their relevancy measured in terms of their ability to 
constrain or facilitate organisational performance.  
Sources of information 
The information used for making the assessment was drawn from a number of sources. It 
included a study of relevant documentation38 and printed materials, as well as interviews with 
key informants or high interest stakeholders who strongly influence organisational – and thus 
programme – performance. One of the key reference documents is the UNMAO data on 
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capacity, which has been collected in support of the transition process. These transition 
summary sheets are rich source of information on capacity.  
During interviews, a semi-structured interview technique was used. This technique has the 
advantage for drawing down on critical issues and investigating causalities; both of which are 
important features of an informative and relevant capacity assessment analysis. In addition to 
these investigatory methods, a number of roundtable discussions took place with those 
national staff assigned with the delivery of the five pillars of mine action. The roundtable 
discussion approach was initially used to elicit the nature of the end states39. 
In order to maximise the effectiveness of resources in the time available, the assessment at 
the organisational level covered the principal national authorities alone and did not extend 
into the tactical, implementation sphere. While it is recognised that implementers have a 
central role to play, the political importance of the national authorities and their various 
abilities to control, coordinate and mobilise resources from government budgets affords them 
a critical role. Intervention for aims of national capacity development (and the subsequent 
support to transition processes) will therefore be most influential at this level.  
Presenting results – the Results Based approach 
Following the summary, a number of specific recommendations are provided, which reflect 
the capacity development requirements of the programme. These recommendations cover 
organisational performance and the facets of the enabling environment that can be improved 
to facilitate rather than constrain this organisational performance (i.e. capacity). Recognising 
that organisational performance is built on the quality of human resources, the assessment 
also presents some recommendations at the human resource level and suggests a number 
of proposed interventions which may include training, coaching, mentoring, study visits and 
other forms of skills and knowledge transfer.  
 
 
Technical performance of national authority
Engage with stakeholders
Conduct needs assessments
Develop policy and strategy
Task, budget and implement
Monitor and evaluate
Governance performance of national authority
Organisational and human resources
Enabling environment
General governance permissiveness 
No evidence of performance 0
Performance (assisted and/or basic competency) 1
Performance (assisted and/or medium competency) 2
Performance (assisted and/or advanced competency) 3



















Notes on Annex D: 
38.  Primarily the Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework, June 2006 
39.  One limitation of the assessment method is the requirement to hold separate discussions with both northern 
and southern authorities. It is assumed that the discussions will remain faithful to the “one country, two-
systems” approach. Where possible, the assessment team will identify opportunities for linkage and areas of 
cooperation.  
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Develop policy and strategy
Task, budget and implement
Monitor and evaluate
Governance performance NMAC
Organisational and human resources
Enabling environment




Develop policy and strategy
Task, budget and implement
Monitor and evaluate
Governance performance SSDC/A
Organisational and human resources
Enabling environment
General governance permissiveness 
No evidence of performance 0
Performance (assisted and/or basic competency) 1
Performance (assisted and/or medium competency) 2
Performance (assisted and/or advanced competency) 3




































Note:  “general governance permissiveness” does not directly equate to performance, instead it represents the extent to which 
international “good” governance practices may be observed within the programme, and additionally the ease in which 
these practices may be promoted within the specific authority.  
 
Note:  where performance of the “enabling environment” is weaker than that of the “organisational and human resources”, this 
should be considered specific areas of policy level concern, and may require introspection on the part of external 
agencies working with the programme, as to whether or how they are constraining or facilitating performance 
 
Note:  the matrices employed above are adapted from a matrix and approach developed by Sekkenes S., and Luff L., 2006. 
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CAPACITY ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME OF ACTIVITIES  
Phase Activity Date Persons Contacted and Met Target Methodology Product 
1. Scoping study, confirmation of 
requirement, development of 
methodology and approach; 
institutional level analysis and 
assessment 
 
16 June – 25 
July 2008 
 
NMAC: Awad Al-Basheer; Abdel-
Monim Jiha; Baballah Brima Baballah,  
SSDC: Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Peter 
Doku, Margaret Mathiang 
UNDP: Qadeem Tariq; Edward 
Meaby; Khalid Abdin.  







Review of normative 
policies and strategies 
to the programme; 
preparatory discussions 
with well informed 
persons, contact with 
senior directing staff 
within national 
authorities; literature 
review of important 
documents and 
evaluations related to 
the programme 
Agreed understanding of 
requirement, approach 
and methodology for the 
assessment. Preliminary 
institutional level capacity 
development 
recommendations. 
2. Organisational and human-
resource level analysis and 
assessment on performance, with 
NMAC and SSDC 
26 July – 20 
August 2008 
NMAC: Awad Al-Basheer; Abdel-
Monim Jiha; Baballah Brima Baballah; 
Adel Abdel Hameid; Khalid Ibrahim; 
Sylvia Michael; Fath El-Rahman 
Gangari; Dr. Ahmed Al-Bedawi; Abdel 
Alielah Khalid; Hesham Mohammed; 
Mozamil Abo Doum. 
SSDC: Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Peter 
Doku, Margaret Mathiang; Egido 
Taban; Philemon Majok; Mike Rashid; 
Malek Deng; Manyiok Nul; Lokujo 
Pater Jonah; Victor Yuggu; Albino 
Deng Juach; Peter Deng; Pater 
Mangezire; Aresto Doku; Rebecca 
Nyakuoth; Joespeh Lesuk Samuel 
;Jurkuch Yaak;   
JIDU: Bior Kuir Deng; Basheer Hassan 
Ahmed 
Ministry of Planning: Kamal Awad 
UNDP: Auke Lootsma; Sue Tatten; 
Ganiyu Ipaye; Musa Ahmed Ibrahim; 
Massimo Diani; Omer Ishag; Qadeem 






with director, senior 
management and 
middle management in 
the NMAC and SSDC to 
analyse future 
performance and 
assess needs. This 
stage included a 
performance appraisal 
with SSDC staff 
Analysis and assessment 
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Pacifico Auguestino 
UNMAO: Nigel Forrestal; Joseph 
McCartan; Lou Luff; Reiko Kurihara; 
Louai Jalal Eldin Mohammed Osman; 
Bjorn Vjokovic; Mohammed Kabeer; 
Karin McLennan 
UNICEF: Insaf Nizam 
SCBL: Abdel Aati Abdel Khair Eid. 
NPA: Charles Frisby 
Cranfield University: Jeff Whitworth 
3. Presentation of early findings, 
endorsement of early 




NMAC: Al-Awad Al-Basheer; Jihat 
Abdel-Monim; Adel Abdel Hameid 
SSDC: Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Peter 
Doku, Margaret Mathiang; Mike 
Rashid; Simon Yak Deng. 
UNDP: Sara Sekkenes; Katrine 
Kristensen; Qadeem Tariq; Edward 
Meaby 
UNMAO: Karin McLennan, Nigel 
Forrestal; Lou Luff; Reiko Kaurihara; 
Severine Flores;   






Workshop held in 
Khartoum for key 
stakeholders on 
Transition, with input 
from UNDP in 
partnership with 
Cranfield University. 
Input designed to 
integrate early capacity 
development findings 
with the transition 
process. Buy-in of 
recommendations 
sought from senior 
directing staff and UN 
colleagues 
Transition policy that is 
compatible with the 
capacity development 




project based approach 
within the Multi-Year 
Work Plan) that has been 
agreed in principle by all 
principle stakeholders to 
the programme. 
4.  Presentation of final report and 
detailed capacity development 
plan for the 2009-2012 
November 
2008 











After internal review of 
sections of the report by 
selected UNDP and 
Cranfield University 
staff; the final report and 
capacity development 
plan are presented to a 
wider audience 
Development plan to 
raise skills and 
competencies for 
governance and 
management that is 
linked to UNDAF, UNDP 
Country Planning 
Document, and the Multi-
Year Work Plan 
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PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR THE QUALITY MANAGEMENT PROJECT 
Result SMART indictors of progressive learning and capacity development 
NMAC and SSDC 
quality managers 
have understood and 
are able to work with 
the NTSGs. 
1. By month 3 (after the project start date), NMAC and SSDC have sent the QM departments of 
all national mine action agencies in their region an approved Arabic translation of the 
NTSGs. 
2. By month 13, 75% of quality managers of NMAC and SSDC have passed a practical test on 
the content of the NTSGs that required them to engage critically with them and respond to 
questions and queries, making reference to the original IMAS and the local operational 
requirements. 
3. By month 36, 4 quality managers, 2 from NMAC and 2 from SSDC, have managed a 
multiple-stakeholder review process for an NTSG. 
NMAC and SSDC 
quality managers are 
able to conduct 
accreditation in a 
transparent and 
formal process in 
accordance with 
NTSGs. 
1. By month 6 (after the project start date), 90% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers have 
participated in operational accreditation of a demining organisation that was proposing to 
conduct clearance work in the country, with UNMAO. 
1. By month 13, 75% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers have passed a written test on the 
entire accreditation process, and have also passed a practical test on the conduct of 
accreditation field visits. 
2. By month 25, 50% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers have express valid views and 
opinions on the accreditation of agencies in review meetings or through their individual 
written reports. 
3. By month 36, 75% of mine action agencies surveyed, whether implementing partners or 
those proposing to conduct clearance, have reported satisfaction with the effectiveness, 
efficiency and integrity of the NMAC and SSDC-led accreditation process. 
NMAC and SSDC 
quality managers can 
manage quality in a 
fair and transparent 
manner, in strict 
adherence to 
NTSGs. 
1. By month 13 (after the project start date), 75% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers on 
payroll have qualified to EOD level III, and have thus demonstrated practical understanding 
of the importance and application of NTSGs in the field. 
2. By month 13, 75% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers have passed a verbal test that 
requires them to explain the purpose of quality management and the principal activities 
associated with quality assurance and quality control. 
3. By month 25, 75% NMAC and SSDC quality managers have conducted one quality 
management visit in partnership with the UNMAO quality assurance team and are able to 
express valid opinions on operations (with respect to the NTSGs) and the level of confidence 
in cleared land. 
4. By month 36, 75% of mine action implementing partners surveyed express satisfaction with 
the competence of NMAC and SSDC-led quality assurance missions. 
Performance 
measurement 
approaches for mine 
action in Sudan have 
been established. 
By month 6 (after the project start date), one trial of mine action performance measurement 
guidelines has been completed by NMAC and SSDC quality management units. 
Note: For all sets of indicators, the general pattern for UNMAO-national authority activities is: learning, to assisted, to 
monitored. However, all performance indicators should be cross-referenced through reports from agencies implementing in 
the field, and not simply based on UNMAO or national authority subject positions. 
 
Annex H 
5 November 2008  Annex H (v2.4) 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PROJECT 
Result SMART indictors of progressive learning and capacity development 
NMAC and SSDC 
have understood and 
worked with the 
IMSMA. 
1. By month 6 (after the project start date), 50% of NMAC and SSDC IMSMA officers have 
received formal training on the basics of IMSMA operation and have been placed by UNMAO 
according to their performance during training. 
2. By month 25, 90% of NMAC and SSDC IMSMA officers have passed an IMSMA test that 
required them to retrieve data and make simple analysis in support of planning and 
operations. 
3. By month 36, 75% of mine action implementing agencies surveyed have reported satisfaction 
with the NMAC and SSDC-led IMSMA product generation process. 
4. By month 36, the UNMAO operational management adviser has expressed confidence in the 
integrity of the IMSMA database. 
NMAC and SSDC 
have developed 
strategy and work-
plans in accordance 
with empirically 
defined need. 
1. By month 13 (after the project start date), with the direct assistance of the UNMAO, the 
NMAC and SSDC operations and planning departments have created a yearly work-plan that 
is consistent with the MYWP, based on empirically defined needs and informed by formal 
policies. 
2. By month 25, with monitoring by the UNMAO, the NMAC and SSDC operations and planning 
departments have developed a longer-term strategy for their region that is based on 
empirically defined needs and informed by formal policies. 
3. By month 36, 75% of the major mine action donors for Sudan, Sudan government partners 
and implementing agencies report that the NMAC and SSDC are able to create effective 
yearly work-plans and longer-term strategies in a justifiable and consistent way. 
NOTE: For all sets of indicators, the general pattern for UNMAO-national authority activities is: learning to assisted to 
monitored. However, all performance indicators should be cross-referenced through reports from agencies implementing in 
the field, and not simply on UNMAO or national authority subject positions. 
 
Annex I 
5 November 2008  Annex I (v2.4) 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PROJECT 




logistical support to 
the mine action 
authorities 
1. By month 13 (after the project start date), 100% of NMAC and SSDC administration, logistics 
and finance officers have received formal training on the basics of their core business 
processes, and have reported satisfaction with an emerging coaching system. 
2. By month 25, 75% of NMAC and SSDC administration, logistics and finance personnel pass 
a test on familiarity with their work requirements and ability to effectively and efficiently 
support operations. 
3. By month 36, 75% of NMAC and SSDC donors report satisfaction with NMAC and SSDC in 
terms of finance, logistics and administration. 
NOTE: For all sets of indicators, the general pattern for UNMAO-national authority activities is: learning to assisted to 
monitored. However, all performance indicators should be cross-referenced through reports from agencies implementing in 
the field, and not simply on UNMAO or national authority subject positions. 
 
 
